ESSAY: Nehru and Tibet – Sixty Years After The Abdication Of Responsibility

FROM THE STATESMAN

By BK Bhattacharyya

Tibet was an independent country. Its language, culture, rituals, heritage and ethos were unique and quite different from China’s. Both traditionally and culturally, it was closer to India. Two of the famous religious centres ~ the Mount Kailash and Manas Sarovar of the Hindus have been located in Tibet since time immemorial. Indian pilgrims used to visit these places in large numbers before the Chinese occupation of Tibet in October 1950. Besides, Tibetan scholars maintained regular contact with their Indian counterparts. This has been echoed by Jawaharlal Nehru. “Nalanda University has attracted students from Tibet. Many Indian classics have been preserved in Tibetan translations relating not only to Buddhism but also to Brahminism, astronomy, mathematics, medicines, etc.” (pp 190 & 217, The Discovery of India, London 1967). Tibet was also a great centre for the cultivation of the tantra cult by Indians.

Tibet was a buffer state between India and China. In his Glimpses of World History, Nehru wrote that “Tibet was independent”. It used to issue passport and visa till it was subjugated by China in 1950. As a sovereign country, Tibet participated in the first Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in April 1947 under the leadership of Nehru, then the Vice-President and foreign minister of the interim government.

India’s relations with Tibet were regulated by the Indo-Tibetan Convention of 1904. The British established a mission in Lhasa and three trade agencies at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok. The convention also provided for a trade agreement between the two countries, deployment of two military detachments and maintenance of post and telegraph services in Tibet. India inherited these rights from the British after it became independent on 15 August 1947. The 1904 convention was “formally confirmed” by the 1906 convention (Anglo-Chinese Treaty). It was signed by Britain and China on 27 April 1906.

Nehru was obsessed with Communism and, therefore, did not entertain any future apprehension from the Chinese Communists. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, however, had anticipated China’s sinister designs on Tibet even before the Communists gained full control over the country. On 4 June 1949, Patel wrote to Nehru: “We have to strengthen our position in Sikkim as well as in Tibet … Tibet has long been detached from China. I anticipate that, as soon as the Communists have established themselves in the rest of China, they will try to destroy its autonomous existence. You have to consider carefully your policy towards Tibet in such circumstances and prepare from now for that eventuality” (p 136, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945-1950, vol 8 edited by Durga Das, Ahmedabad 1973). The Communists, even before acquiring control over the whole of China, had started an anti-India campaign. In September 1949, “a Chinese magazine accused the Prime Minister of India of aiding imperialist designs for the annexation of Tibet and charged him with the beastly ambition of aggression”. (p 76, With Nehru in The Foreign Office by Subimal Dutta, Calcutta 1977).

Again in September 1949, “the Communist Radio asserted that Tibet was a part of China and that the British and American imperialists and their running dog, Nehru, are now plotting a coup in Lhasa for the annexation to Tibet”. (pp 294-295), India from Curzon to Nehru and After by Durga Das, New Delhi 1969). Sardar Patel and Dr Rajendra Prasad were annoyed with Nehru’s policy on Tibet and felt that “the Communist Radio comment was a danger signal which New Delhi must heed” (p 295 ibid)

In October 1950, China occupied Tibet. Since then, it has been a source of our anxiety, angst and apprehension. On 2 November 1950, the Union cabinet met ostensibly to accord post facto approval as the surrender of Tibet was a fait accompli. Five days later, Patel wrote to Nehru, highlighting the grave danger that India would face consequent to the surrender of Tibet to China. The letter is a very valuable historical document and I quote: “I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the external affairs ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese government … I regret to say that … the Chinese government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intentions … At a crucial period they managed to instil into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means … The final action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is little short of perfidy.”

In the same letter Patel told Nehru: “The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes … of Chinese malevolence … It appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions … There was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he (our Ambassador in Peking) made to the Chinese government on our behalf …”

Drawing Nehru’s attention to China’s long-term objective, Patel wrote: “Even though we regard ourselves as friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends”. The surrender of Tibet was the Himalayan blunder and Patel had warned Nehru that China has come “almost up to our gates”. He anticipated the danger from China to “our Northern or north-eastern approaches consisting of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam”. He suggested an early discussion with Nehru with a view to meeting the “Chinese irredentism and Communist imperialism” (pp 335-341, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945-50 vol 10 edited by Durga Das, Ahmedabad 1974). The meeting did not take place.

On 9 November 1950, Patel told a public meeting in Delhi, “A peaceful country like Tibet has been invaded and it may not survive. There has been no aggression from its side. The whole border becomes exposed to danger. We should, therefore, be vigilant” (p 148, For a Unified India: Speeches of Sardar Patel 1947-1950, New Delhi 1982).

KM Panikkar was India’s Ambassador to China during the crucial period. His role was not commendable. On 14 September 1950 a complacent Nehru in his letter to Vijayalakshmi Pandit (then our Ambassador to the USA) stated that the Chinese “listen to us”. In the same letter he praised Panikkar, saying that he “gets on very well with the Chinese Government” (p 510, Patel: A Life by Rajmohan Gandhi, Ahmedabad 1992). Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, who was the Foreign Secretary at that point of time “complained to Nehru that Panikkar had been influenced more by the Chinese point of view, by Chinese claims, by Chinese maps and by regard for Chinese susceptibilities than by his instructions or by India’s interests” (P 511, ibid).

India should not have abdicated its authority, power and responsibility which devolved on her on 15 August 1947 under the 1904 Indo-Tibetan convention. It should have asserted itself instead of meekly surrendering Tibet at the nation’s peril.

Nehru believed China. He never imagined that “Peking represented a threat to Indian interests in the foreseeable future” (p 83 of Subimal Dutt’s book). Brigadier JP Dalvi in his book, Himalayan Blunder, has written that in 1954, Nehru revealed his mind when he said: “What right does India have to keep a part of its Army in Tibet, whether Tibet is independent or part of China?” (p 22). Nehru also told Durga Das that “he would not quarrel with China over Tibet. He would not take over Curzon’s role and establish Indian influence in Lhasa” (p 295, India from Curzon to Nehru and After).

Patel had been able to see through the Chinese games, motives, machinations and manoeuvres whereas Nehru did not. He ignored Patel’s warning and brought China “almost up to our gates” endangering the country’s security perpetually. The net result was that India was humiliated by China in November 1962, when it invaded NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh. A shocked Nehru had to describe it as “a perfidy”.

The writer is a former Joint Secretary, Assam government