A large number of military officers concur that the Indian army, with an inordinately high teeth-to-tail ratio, faces a serious crisis of confidence.
An alarming rise in the number of Indian military officers charged with corruption, senior ranks quitting due to frustrating service conditions, and increasing instances of ‘fragging' in which disgruntled soldiers shoot dead their seniors, are severely damaging the image of the country's defence forces.
Few want to join the once-favoured military with the shortage of officers in the army never having fallen below 11,000 for over a decade against a sanctioned strength of 46,615 personnel. The navy and the air force too face officer shortage but it is not as severe as in the 1.2 million strong army.
Senior defence officials cite expanding employment opportunities as the reason behind the shortage. But serving and retired officers say this is only part of the cause. The Services too have to take responsibility for lowering the military's image and overall standing in the country's order of precedence and preference, they point out.
“Standards and values have changed for the worse and the army is not impervious to the overall environment,” admits a retired Lieutenant General. Like the rest of society, India's military too is in the turbulent and unsettling throes of transition, he adds.
Serving army officers say the ‘rot' in service ethics has been steadily creeping into the Services. Till the 1980s, military officers were considered upright men, respected in society and eagerly sought after by parents as suitable match for their daughters. Retired military men talk nostalgically of the days when a mere note from the commanding officer on behalf of a jawan to the local authorities back in his village carried weight.
Those were the times when the esprit d' corps in the apolitical service was strong and invitations to riotous, albeit swinging, regimental officers' messes were much sought after. Salaries were low but the lifestyle was lavish in what was largely a gentleman's army.
Many officers were, in reality, eager boys trapped inside adult bodies seeking to indulge in passions like shikar, riding, polo and outdoor living and danger at state expense as expansive colonial traditions made military service not only respectable but attractive. From Independence till the third war with Pakistan in 1971, there was ample opportunity for such expansiveness.
And it was adequately vindicated, except for the disastrous 1962 war with China in which India came off badly. But in this instance, it was widely acknowledged that it was the political and not the military establishment that forced ignominy upon the country.
The flamboyance, bravery and tactical brilliance of all ranks in the three wars with Pakistan are well recorded and the subject of study in combat institutions around the world. It is rarely acknowledged even at home that in 1971, the Indian army single-handedly achieved what even the United States with all its mite and technical wizardry has not managed since World War II — it liberated a nation.
Politics was rarely, if at all, discussed by officers who, if passed over for promotion, retired gracefully, confident of their status in society. Promotions, the bane of the Services today, were merit-based and, by and large, fair with undeserving candidates, adhering to the Peter Principle and rarely ever crossing their limits of incompetence.
Army chiefs and senior commanders brooked no political interference in operational matters and were listened to with respect by the establishment. Asked by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to move into East Pakistan — later Bangladesh — in early 1971, General Sam Manekshaw — later Field Marshal — firmly told her that it would take at least 10 months before his force would be ready for combat.
“That” he declared, referring to Indira Gandhi's scheme of launching operations earlier “would present me with problems far more complex than what had been the bane of the German general staff for more than 50 years across two world wars. It would be unwise to rely on diplomatic assurances that the Chinese would not react in support of Pakistan. We must wait for the snow to block the northern passes.” Indira Gandhi listened and Bangladesh came into being in December that year.
In short, the olive green uniform enjoyed an exalted status it was soon to lose. Its professionalism and apolitical stance began to slowly unravel after the Third Pay Commission in the late 1970s when officer ranks were diluted, ostensibly to enhance career prospects, but their responsibilities reduced in inverse proportion to their promotions.
Periodic cadre reviews further led to a lopsided rank structure creating a situation where Lieutenant Generals among the seniormost army officers, and their equivalents in the navy and the air force, discharged duties previously performed by middle-ranking Colonels and half-colonels and similar ranks in the other two services.
Currently there are over 900 Brigadiers, some 290 Major Generals and 85-odd Lieutenant Generals, roughly around a third of who were replaced every two-three years due to retirement, promotion and other reasons.
Pressure on promotions in the pyramid-like structure also meant that most served between 12-18 months in these higher ranks leaving them little time to effect any meaningful change in the overall command and control structure.
The cadre re-assessment was the moment for which politicians and civil servants had long been waiting. Having always looked upon the military with suspicion after independence and gazing nervously at Pakistan's experience, they were simply waiting for an opportunity to gain ascendancy over the Services.
Incidentally, this inherent misgiving and fear of the military persists, adversely manifesting itself in the non-appointment of a Chief of Defence staff, despite ministerial commissions and review and parliamentary committees stressing the need for such an officer in a nuclear weapon state and for an expanding military power with possible out-of-area responsibilities.
Sadly, many senior officers actively contributed to this negative state of affairs by seeking political and bureaucratic patronage for career enhancement whilst in service and for lucrative sinecures after retirement. Consequently, over years the military's standing deteriorated, reaching the unbelievable stage where it was selectively included in the “security loop.”
The Service chiefs, for instance, were told about the multiple 1998 Shakti tests at Pokhran just hours before they occurred; and that too as insurance against any “adverse reaction” from neighbouring Pakistan. In the intervening period thereafter, the military has been dealt a limited hand in maintaining India's strategic deterrence.
In another shocker, the military, particularly the army, was also unaware of India's cache of chemical weapons stored at various Defence Research and Development Organisation laboratories across the country that were destroyed under the global Chemicals Weapon Convention some years ago.
In conclusion, a large number of military officers concur that India's Mughal-like army, with an inordinately high teeth-to-tail ratio, faces a serious crisis of confidence which simply refuses to abate even as it is increasingly employed not only in counter-insurgency operations, flood and drought relief but also to battle mosquitoes threatening the Commonwealth Games athletes' village.
For, besides struggling against the slew of corruption charges, lopsided promotions and un-equitable pensions, the military also faces ad hoc equipping policies determined and dominated by ill-informed politicians and civil servants, as it grapples desperately to reorder and modernise itself within a nuclear weapon state. But that, as they say, is a far longer and complex saga.
(Rahul Bedi is New Delhi-based defence analyst.)

source: The Hindu