By Dr Subhash Kapila
‘However, its less the size of China’s defense budget than its
composition that alarms beyond its borders. China’s military spending privileges
the navy, air force and strategic nuclear forces—instruments of advanced power
projection—rather than traditional defensive capabilities. No Chinese leader has
yet explained how these capabilities contribute to China’s peaceful rise”. —
Daniel Twining, Washington, USA.
Introductory Observations
China’s Defence Budget 2012 announced in the first week of March 2012
significantly draws global and regional attention in that China has shot through
its defence expenditure over the $ 100 billion mark, making China’s military
expenditure at the global level, second only to that of the United States, even
though there exists a wide differential between the two.
In terms of global concerns, China’s hikes in defence expenditures in 2012
military budget come under sharper scrutiny when China’s defence hikes are
placed in the context of a sharp drop in United States defence budget by about $
380 billion necessitated by US Congressional mandates. Though President Obama
has reiterated that the Asia Pacific regional military posture of the United
States would not be in the purview of budgetary cuts because of the new US
strategic pivot to Asia Pacific, what cannot be ruled out is that in case of a
sudden Middle East contingency, the United States would be forced to redirect US
Forces from its strengthened posture against a fast militarily rising China.
Regionally in Asia, steep hikes in Chinese military expenditure cause
multiple strategic and military concerns for China’s neighbours. Contextually,
China’s recent aggressiveness and military assertion (facilitated by China’s
military rise, fuelled by expanding economic resources) on territorial disputes
foisted by China on virtually all its neighbours, multiply these concerns.
China - India Relations
China’s military hikes would have been understandable had China’s peripheries
on land and sea would have been threatening to China’s security. Such is not the
case because the military balance is overwhelmingly in favour of China. China
could convert this military balance in its favour for the last two decades
because of United States earlier permissiveness to tolerate China’s military
build-up as it suited United States and in the last decade because of the
military and strategic distractions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
China’s expanded military budget comes immediately after President Obama’s
announcement of the policy of a strategic pivot to Asia Pacific. China denies
that the two are connected. In this connection it needs to be pointed out that
China would continue to increase its military expenditure irrespective of any
strategic steps of the United States. China’s strategic aims are to emerge as
the undisputed military power in Asia and a rival power centre on the global
strategic calculus.
In this connexion, it needs to be pointed out that scientific projections
have been made which state that China’s military budget hikes are expected to
total $ 238.2 billion by 2015 which when translated amounts to more than
doubling China’s military expenditure in just another three years. China’s
existing military profile a before the announcement of Budget 2012 is
considerably powerful and would become more powerful with $106 billion planned
for this year. Doubling of the budget by 2015 would facilitate China’s military
profile to emerge so powerful that no Asian country, not even India, can ever
hope to militarily catch up with China.
India’s defence budget in the year ending was about $36 billion—a fraction of
China’s military budget. Shockingly, a former Defence Secretary was quoted in
the media that every year the Finance Ministry would demand in March that the
Defence Ministry surrender Rs 5,000 crores or so to balance the deficit in the
Union Budget. He further added that for the last ten years the Defence Ministry
was being made to surrender such amounts. This would total to Rs 50,000 crores
cut from announced Defence budgets. This year the news has come that the Defence
Ministry has been ordered not to sign existing defence purchases agreements till
after 31 March 2012 including the order to purchase the 126 fighter planes badly
needed by the Indian Air Force. It is distressing that to balance the Finance
Ministry books and Union budget deficits arising from exorbitantly wasteful
schemes, the Government plays around with India’s war preparedness in an
extremely hostile environment.
India should be more than seriously concerned about China’s hiked defence
expenditures considering that ‘The China Threat’ to India is more real than to
other nations, simply because China perceives that India is its sizeable and
comparable strategic and military Asian rival and could impede China’s rise and
emergence as the undisputed military power in Asia. Strategically, it is ironic
that despite the credibility and potency of ‘The China Threat’, India’s
political leadership and apex national security establishment traditionally
disconnected from its Armed Forces who manage ‘The China Threat’, continue to
de-emphasize this threat and get tricked into China’s protestations that China’s
rise is a ‘peaceful rise’.
Against such a backdrop it becomes incumbent on India’s strategic community
to highlight and reiterate the implications arising for India’s national
security of China’s rising military expenditures. This Paper intends to do so
under the following heads:
- China Defence Budget 2012: Salient Features and Thrust Areas for Military
Up- gradation
- India’s National Security: Implications of China Defence Budget
2012
- Can India Ever Militarily Check-mate China?
China Defence Budget 2012: Salient Features and Thrust Areas for Military
Up-gradation
Statistical data and comparative analyses of China Defence Budget abound in
the international media and are not going to be repeated here. The aim in this
Paper is to provide a macro-level overview the Chinese defence budget for 2012
and the issues arising from the salient features that will be examined. This
part of the Paper intends to examine it under the following heads; (1) Chinese
Defence Budget 2012 –salient details of increased military expenditure (2)
Chinese official explanations for the increased military spending (3) Analytical
explanations for China’s increased military spending, and (4) Main thrust areas
for Chinese military up-gradation.
Very briefly, Chinese military spending in 2012 is planned to increase by
11.2% to $106.4billion from $ 95.6 billion last year. China has on the average
registered an annual increase of 12% in its defence spending. Between 2006 and
2011 China doubled its defence spending and by 2015 it will again be doubled.
That indicates the colossal military expenditures that China has indulged in and
what is going to be spent by China in the next three years. The strategic and
political implications for the United States, China’s Asian neighbours and
particularly India are serious, deep-rooted and long-range.
China’s official explanations are the traditional choreographed ones of
defending national sovereignty, internal security and the requirement of
protecting China’s long borders with fourteen countries and China’s long
coastline. However, some official explanations forthcoming need to be quoted
verbatim, and these are as follows:
- Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiao Bao: “We will enhance the armed forces
capacity to accomplish a wide range of tasks, the most important of which is to
win local wars under information age conditions”.
- China NPC Official spokesperson and Former Foreign Minister Xao Zhing:
“China’s limited military power is for the sake of national sovereignty,
security and territorial integrity. Fundamentally, it constitutes no threat to
other countries”.
- Professor Su Hao, Chinese Foreign Ministry University, Beijing: “There are
new issues (that need funding) like the protection of citizens and investments
overseas”
The stress on winning local wars needs to be noted as this is reference to
China’s peripheries where territorial disputes abound and which notably includes
India. The ‘new issues’ are significant as it is a pointer to China’s expansion
of force-projection capabilities without which protection of Chinese citizens
and Chinese investments abroad cannot be undertaken. Is China signalling its
future intentions of military interventions being undertaken much beyond China’s
peripheries?
Analytically, one can advance a number of explanations for China’s increased
military expenditures, the chief of which being are: (1) China’s present
increase in military expenditure and doubling of that figure by 2015 is
predictable in light of the United States strategic pivot to Asia Pacific which
China perceives as US fencing-in of China (2) Chinese increased defence
expenditures are aimed at upgrading of China’s military capabilities to deter
any possible US military intervention against China or making it prohibitive (3)
China’s quest for equal strategic weight with the United States would involve
China’s military up- gradation to reduce the differential in the US-China
military power.
China’s main thrusts in military up-gradation of its capabilities is
obviously US-Centric in that China is aiming to dilute US military superiorities
which can come in play militarily against China. However, Chinese enhancement in
relation to the United States has more than disproportionate strategic impact on
India. Contextually, in light of the preceding analysis China’s main thrust
areas for sizeable military investments will be concentrated on the
following:
- Second Artillery Corps which is entrusted with the management and
operational use of China’s nuclear weapons arsenal and ballistic missiles
arsenal. New generation of ICBMs and other missiles with greater emphasis on
range and increased accuracy are in the pipeline.
- China Navy: China’s first aircraft carrier will be operational by the end of
this year. China is planning to induct at least four aircraft carriers in the
next few years. In terms of force projection, China is inducting amphibious
warfare ships and logistics tenders. In terms of Chinese “anti-access and area
denial” strategies against any United States possible military intervention, the
Chinese Navy is planning introduction of land-based long range anti-ship
missiles against US aircraft carriers, greater number of nuclear attack
submarines, increased maritime reconnaissance and patrolling, and an overall
increase in number of naval combat ships.
- China Air Force: China has planned a complete turn-over of its fighter
aircraft fleet. Introduction of the J-20 Stealth Fighter planes is being speeded
up. China has also expressed interest in the acquisition of the Russian SU-35
latest combat aircraft which competed for the Indian Air Force competition also.
Up gradation of the bomber fleet and heavy lift strategic transport aircraft
akin to the US C-17.-are in the pipeline to augment Chinese force-projection
capabilities.
In addition to the above China is investing significantly in space warfare
capabilities. China is working on anti-satellite weapons designed to neutralize
US spy, targeting, navigation and communication satellites. China’s cyber
warfare increasing capabilities have become a strategic headache for the United
States military.
Not to be forgotten in terms of China’s military up-gradation is an increase
of Chinese nuclear weapons arsenal. So far Chinese nuclear weapons arsenal has
not been subjected to any strategic arms limitation treaty or any other
scrutiny. The United States while raising hype on Chinese military up-gradations
has steadfastly been muted on the subject of the increasing nuclear weapons
stockpile of China.
Also to be noted is that China’s arms imports have shown a decrease
indicating an increase in greater sophistication of its own R&D
technological expertise and expanding defence production capabilities.
India’s National Security: Implications of China Defence Budget 2012
Analysed
India’s national security has consistently stood compromised by the
persistent annual double digit increases in Chinese defence expenditure, and
China Defence Budget 2012 is no exception. China crossing the $ 100 billion mark
in defence expenditure in military plans for 2012 further accentuates and
highlights India’s military unpreparedness to meet any possible Chinese military
adventurism against India. In military budget comparisons itself, the Indian
defence budget at about $36 billion pales into insignificance against China’s
earmarked figure of $ 106.4 billion for 2012. The comparison gets more sombre
when in comparison China faces no credible military threat from any global power
or Asian power whereas India has pronounced military threats from an
ever-military rising China and its strategic ally Pakistan, with comparable long
and sea frontiers to protect against them—both of them having a record of
military adventurism and an expanding nuclear weapons arsenal.
Dispelling notions that one is advocating an arms race with China, it however
needs to be noted and commonly understood within India and by Indians is that
India’s defence postures against China are grossly inadequate both in terms of
conventional military power and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Suffice
it to say that India today lacks both nuclear deterrence and conventional
military deterrence against China. There is no such thing as minimum credible
deterrence. Credible deterrence is relative to the adversaries strike
capabilities to be effective.
In this Paper, I have no intention to draw a detailed comparative military
balance between a military powerful China and an India where military up
-gradations and effective war preparedness are at best given notional attention
by the political leadership and apex national security establishment at best,
and at worst a strategic obliviousness by both these entities arising from their
strategic naivety in benign reading of Chinas military intentions underlying its
recurrent and relentless military build-up.
The aim is to educate the India that exists outside the sphere of India’s
apex national security decision-makers and the Indian Armed Forces hierarchy
which gets disconnected from its political masters by Nehru’s archaic
interposing of a strategic culture-deficit civilian bureaucracy of India’s
Ministry of Defence.
India in relation to war preparedness to effectively meet ‘The China Threat’
can be said to be in the same repeat Nehruvian strategic mind-set of de-emphasis
and under-playing of ‘The China Threat’ as that existed in the run-up to India’s
1962 military debacle foisted on the gallant Indian Army by its political
leadership and its civilian bureaucracy. This assertion can be substantiated by
Indian TV channels, particularly which stands reported having been pressurised
to downplay Chinese intrusions into Indian Territory and not give them
prominence.
The Chinese Prime Minister has reiterated this month and is quoted above,
that China’s strategic aim is to win local wars under information age conditions
and that is significant in relation to India for obvious reasons. Recently a
high-powered committee in its report has been quoted in the media as having
expressed that China is likely to make a military grab for portions of Ladakh
and Arunachal Pradesh. This belated recognition of ‘The China Threat’ against
India provides the setting for the succeeding brief examination of our
‘Defensive Postures” against China across the entire military spectrum. It is
intended to do so under the following heads (1) India’s Nuclear weapons and
missiles arsenal (2) Military postures in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh reviewed
(3) Indian Air Force-the major voids (4) Indian Navy- Need for wholesale
expansion (5) Strategic infrastructure along Himalayan Borders sadly
neglected.
India’s nuclear deterrence against China is woefully inadequate both in terms
of numbers and reach.Intrnational reports indicate that even Pakistan is
outstripping India in this sphere. China accorded delayed grudging strategic
respect to India only after the 1998 nuclear weaponization of India. The crying
need is to make India’s ICBM operational which so far has been held back by
India’s strategic timidity against US pressures. That materialization would
greatly offset India’s current lack of dissuasive conventional military
deterrence.
Military postures in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh have been analysed in fair
detail in my earlier Papers. Briefly to be highlighted is that both the Ladakh
and Arunachal Pradesh Sectors require force accretions in addition to those
planned by an additional mountain division each and integral limited offensive
capability. Protecting India’s national sovereignty involves boots-on-the-ground
along the Himalayan borders which cannot be replicated by high technology. To
that extent the argument of those who advocate a ‘leaner meaner military
machine’ does not hold ground.
India’s skies stand naked against Indian military adversaries today with
voids of nearly 150 combat fighter aircraft. It took the Indian decision-makers
ten years to clear the choice of the next MRCA and even now the agreement is on
hold due to Finance Ministry’s budget-deficit balancing. India’s transport
aircraft fleet has out-lived its normal operational life and no replacements are
in view. The switch to US inventories would carry its own problems. The Indian
Air Force both in wartime and in peacetime too needs to be maintained at optimum
levels in terms of its authorised aircraft holdings. Case exists for increasing
the Indian Air Force combat squadrons to 45 squadrons—a figure that was
recommended immediately in the wake of 1962 military debacle.
China has made no secret of its naval ambitions on a strong Chinese naval
presence in the Indian Ocean and is working in a focused manner towards that
ambition. China’s acquisition of four to six aircraft carriers, nuclear attack
submarines and amphibious warfare capabilities, makes a strategic call on Indian
decision-makers to embark on a wholesale fast-track expansion of the Indian Navy
assets. India cannot afford to await 10-12 years lead times for materialization
of naval orders to Indian shipyards. The biggest worry is the slippage allowed
in replacement of the current fleet of submarines.
India’s’ strategic infrastructure along the Himalayan borders is sadly
neglected The Prime Minister should have made a personal push in this direction
as critical lifelines are 3-5 years behind schedule due to inter-ministerial
wrangling. After the 1962 War with China some notable projects which needed
speedy implementation were a double road artery to Tawang and Bumla in Arunachal
Pradesh, a road tunnel under the Rohtang Pass for the alternative road to
Ladakh, widening of the Rangli road axis to Jelep La in Sikkim and a major
bypass of Gangtok with a highway to Nathu La. Space does not permit greater
elaboration.
Lastly India’s decision making elite should answer as to why the Indian
aeronautical industry which goes back to around 1943 has not been encouraged to
become capable of fast-track development of Indian Air Force requirements of
fighter aircraft and transport aircraft within the country.
Can India Ever Militarily Checkmate China?
Strategic analysis would suggest that it should be a pressing strategic
imperative for Indian decision-makers to work towards a military checkmating of
China to neutralise ‘The China Threat’ and in turn the Pakistan threat
assiduously nurtured militarily by China. But the follow-up question is whether
India can ever hope to militarily checkmate China and improve India’s security
environment?
Going by current trends of the Indian political leadership and the apex
national security establishment of investing more on diplomacy than military
preparedness to ward off ‘The China Threat’, the analytical answer is a big
NO.
Checkmating China by India involves two major questions. Firstly, the
political will and strategic audacity of India’s leadership to adopt a
‘hands-on’ approach to checkmate China, not as a strategic subsidiary of the
United States but standing tall on its own two legs. Secondly, does India have
adequate financial resources to bankroll increased defence expenditure to
acquire substantial nuclear and conventional military deterrence to checkmate
China from its current strategy in South Asia?
The answer to the first question is that it is unlikely that the existing
mind-sets of India’s political leadership and apex national security
establishment would undergo a change. Both these entities are likely to
concentrate all strategic decision-making with themselves bypassing
institutional inputs. Also keeping the Indian Armed Forces hierarchy out of apex
level national security decision-making and more vitally nuclear weapons
decision-making by these two entities leads to ‘mentally challenged’ strategic
policy decisions. Political will and strategic audacity therefore cannot blossom
in such a truncated decision-making environment.
The second question pertains to financial resources to bankroll sizeable
defence expenditure to acquire substantial nuclear and conventional military
deterrence against China. Financial resources are no longer a problem today for
India. The Indian problem on increased defence expenditure is that massive
amounts of the Indian budget are earmarked for non-productive political-populist
schemes like NREGA and other subsidies which lead to substantial budget deficits
and to offset which the Defence Budget becomes the notable casualty in terms of
being asked to surrender thousands of crores of rupees every year before the
presentation of the Budget.
The existing mind-set of underwriting wasteful expenditures on
political-populist measures at the cost of Indian national security requires a
complete transformation of policy approaches.
So the final answer is that India will never be able to militarily checkmate
China’s enhanced military postures impinging on Indian security. If India’s
political leadership under different political dispensations had been imbued
with the will of checkmating China, they would not have allowed India’s slippage
in its defensive postures and war preparedness, and kept pace with China’s
constant military expenditure increases, not in an arms race, but in a sincere
effort to not to allow the strategic and military chasm between China and India
in terms of nuclear and conventional military deterrence differentials to
grow.
Concluding Observations
China’s defence budgets every year have registered double-digit increases
over the last two decades. This has facilitated China to emerge as the dominant
military power in Asia and a contender capable of a serious challenge to United
States global military predominance. China has achieved this posture by spending
significant amounts on military expenditure facilitated by a booming
economy.
India in contrast also has a booming economy but it has been niggardly in its
defence expenditures as defence expenditure is made subservient to
political-populist schemes. Capital acquisition of critical military hardware
are delayed for decades due to political indecision, bureaucratic lethargy and
other considerations which view capital acquisitions of critical military
equipment from abroad with extraneous perspectives.
Resulting from the above is the stark strategic reality that India will not
be able to militarily checkmate China. In 1962, China militarily humiliated
India due to lack of Indian defence preparedness in the preceding two decades.
In 2012, with existing mind-sets at the highest-level in India and the slippage
that has taken place in defence outlays in the last two decades, India risks a
similar repeat 1962 performance of not a military debacle (thanks to the Indian
Armed Forces used to making-do with military hardware available with them to
defend India) but of a “strategic diminishment” of India on the global stage
which India aspires to ascend.