Chinese diplomacy - Good intentions?

Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy: Chinese diplomacy - Good intentions?

Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy / New Delhi June 12, 2011, 0:16 IST
source: Business Stabdard

The current debate in India over whether to engage with an emerging China is, in many ways, a debate over how to think about China’s future intentions. India is concerned about the expansion of Chinese influence and construction of transport links to South Asia (roads, railways and ports).

However, the perception of Chinese threats that pervades the Indian policy community’s psyche is not shared by the country’s border populations. They think that if the Indian government is serious about developing roads in the region (and thus helping to develop the region itself), this could be done faster by inviting global tenders and by using advanced technologies. Instead, the government is relying on the Border Roads Organisation, which seems incapable of delivering timely projects, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh. Indeed, when Indian policy makers perceived Chinese access diplomacy as a potential threat to Indian interests, they started talking about making the border “irrelevant”. Thus, a sense of insecurity in border areas worked as a catalyst in India’s policy thinking in bringing attention to the socio-economic development of its peripheral regions.




In contrast, China has used border trade as its main instrument to realise the goal of local economic integration. It is estimated that border trade through its 120 inland towns and ports constitutes about half of China’s total foreign trade amounting to $1.3 trillion. The central government has given a high degree of autonomy to provincial governments. China looks at Nathu La Pass in Sikkim as a vital physical economic entry into the 1.3 billion person South Asian market. This is arguably the shortest route (roughly 590 km between Tibet and Sikkim) to the heartland of India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. Furthermore, Tibet has huge mineral resources with a potential value of more than $125 billion. Due to the high cost of transportation, raw materials in Tibet cannot be easily transported out of the province. Hence, the Chinese government is significantly improving infrastructure there. Unquestionably, increasing Chinese connectivity has created new opportunities for people of the region.

People in the border areas feel that China is looking for markets and resources on an ever-increasing scale in order to sustain its developmental needs. China’s access diplomacy to South Asia has very abiding and powerful objectives, including expansion of its strategic access; economic and commercial penetration into the huge South Asian market; and tackling its own potential internal instabilities. In the last 30 years, China has transformed itself from an astute proponent of ideological influence and covert supporter of insurgency, to a builder of cross-border modern infrastructures and a market grabber.

China has a conscious policy of engaging South Asian countries at a local level, giving traders a literally free hand to go and negotiate. For example, China has given rights to Tibetan traders to go to Sikkim and negotiate, despite all their other concerns. This grant of autonomy is a distinct instrument of foreign policy.

Even Indian government officials (civilian and military) posted in border regions feel that China’s South Asia ties are dictated by geography, the need for security and stability, mutual economic advantage, shared cultural traditions, common approaches to the management of natural disasters and climate change, and developmental priorities. According to one Indian military official posted in Tawang, “China may be almost a superpower now, but it is not an irrational power. It has as big a stake in stability as India. Its economy, finance and exports are all much more globalised than ours, so do not expect China to take any risks by way of entering into military conflict with India.” The talk of ‘strategic encirclement’ (involving naval installations on India’s periphery) is viewed by many as an overreaction to facts on the ground. China, like India but in keeping with its greater resources, is investing in its military capability and doubtless seeks to extend its strategic reach.

Though there may well be a military component in Chinese activities in countries on India’s borders, it is not the primary one. China’s priorities are to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, promote economic development, and generate international respect. Local people see Chinese roads and railways as an opportunity for India. Are Indians much different?

It was long held that an undeveloped border region in the northeast enhanced the security of the heartland as roads and bridges might provide easy connectivity for inimical forces — not necessarily armies but a variety of subversive elements, arms and drug-runners, smugglers and even legitimate traders who might overwhelm the national economy by dumping cheap consumer goods. But for the local population, whose development has lagged painfully, roads and bridges mean fresh possibilities for trade, quick supply of goods, closer linkages with the rest of India and a great expansion of inter-village amity in the interior. Their needs should be recognised and respected by India’s strategic community, while local populations must accept that borders more open to economic intercourse with China will offer some risks to the country as a whole beyond the obvious opportunities involved.

There is a need for greater exchange of ideas and visits between representatives of these two countries. The unprecedented challenges emerging for India from the rise of China require more confidence building measures. China is a “strategic challenge” for India and there is no pragmatic alternative for India other than engaging China.

(The author is a PhD scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. This piece is based on the discussions he conducted during his field research)