What explains Chinese ‘aggression'

Nilanjan Banik

Source: Hindubusinessline

  

China's growing interest in the South-East Asian region has been in the news recently. However, its actions are, in fact, quite rational from its standpoint, and are an outcome of a combination of factors, such as protectionist measures in the US and the EU against Chinese exports; unabated price rise in China, including higher labour costs, energy prices and land rents; and the appreciation of the renminbi. In this scenario, the South-East Asian region promises access to a bigger market.

China also stands to gain by tapping into captive resources of this region, especially, minerals and energy.

CHINA AFTER 2008

The financial crisis since 2008 has seriously affected world trade, with some governments resorting to protectionist measures such as anti-dumping and countervailing measures to protect their domestic industries. Such protectionist measures are hurting China the most. During 2008, Chinese exports to the EU and the US fell by 19.4 per cent and 12.5 per cent, respectively.

Global Trade Alert (a database tracking number of protectionist measures imposed around the world) has indicated that as many as 659 measures were initiated against Chinese exports after 2008. Most of these measures originated from Russia (31), Germany (18), France (16), United Kingdom (17), Spain (16), Italy (15), Netherlands (15), Sweden (13), Austria (13), Belgium (13), Finland (13), in Europe, and USA (9). China's trade surplus fell from US$ 298.12 billion in 2008 to US$ 195.84 billion in 2009.

Chinese firms are looking for alternative production bases to evade such protectionist measures. Given its geographical proximity to mainland China, the South-East Asian region becomes a natural choice.

Higher Input Cost

The China growth story is still intact, making it a favoured destination among foreign fund managers. Last year, China has received more foreign funds than any of the other BRIC economies. The expectation about future appreciation of Chinese renminbi has also been an influential factor enhancing the inflow of foreign funds.

The Chinese central bank has been frantically trying to keep renminbi from appreciating further, by actively intervening in the foreign exchange market. However, such active intervention and increase in incomes in China, have resulted in overheating of the economy. Wages of migrant workers, land, property rents, and power prices, have all registered an increase.

On a year-on-year basis, as of November 2010, labour costs were up by 21 per cent, and the home prices across 70 cities in China have gone up 7.7 per cent. Estimates made in 2010 suggest minimum annual wage rates in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are $600, $434, and $1200-1500, respectively. If one were to add the mandatory welfare allowances to the minimum annual wage rates, then the Chinese labour costs are at least double compared with other regions in South-East Asia.

Property prices are also on the rise. What is worrisome is that property prices are rising despite the government's ownership rights on land – indicating a possible real estate bubble. China has also imposed stricter pollution control norms on its industries, raising the marginal cost of producing goods in China.

Hence, Chinese firms stand to gain by shifting production bases to the neighbouring south-east Asian region. Also, since the Chinese currency has been appreciating since 2005 and is expected to appreciate further, there is a feeling Chinese exports will become more expensive as well.

Chinese firms can gain by importing raw material and using this to produce finished goods outside China.

Access to a bigger market

Trade and investment measures undertaken in the South-East Asian region are non-discriminatory and complementary in nature.

These nations are increasingly driving down tariff barriers and other border costs. Most of the items are traded at zero tariffs among the member countries. Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar are all part of Asean. As on January 1, 2010, duties on 99.65 per cent of all tariff lines under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the Asean Free Trade Area have been eliminated.

For the newer Asean member-states — Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam — 98.96 per cent of total tariff lines are within the tariff range of 0-5 per cent.

Since October 2003, China and Thailand have taken the lead in implementing zero tariffs on agricultural products, covering 200 types of fruit and vegetables. China has also granted zero tariffs treatment to Cambodia (83 products), Laos (91 products) and Myanmar (87 products). Free market access for Chinese exports into this region means a larger market for their manufacturers.

When compared with the other provinces like Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan, Jiangsu, Beijing, Shenzhen, and Tianjin, the provinces of Yunnan and the Guangxi (bordering south-east Asia), are relatively underdeveloped. Given their geographical proximity to South Asia and the Asean markets, China can gain substantially by developing these two regions and improving their linkages with Asean neighbours.

Since 1996, Chinese firms have constructed six hydro-power plants and one thermal power station in Myanmar. China has also invested in power transmission, and copper processing activities in Vietnam. Dongfang Electric of China has won a contract to construct a coal-fired thermal plant at Hai Phong, Vietnam.

At present, there has been ownership issue over the Spratly Islands, and the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Brunei, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam, each has notified United Nations about their share of claim.

The US wanted to mediate using the Asean forum, which China has been opposing. So what the Indian media calls Chinese aggression appears to be quite rational on the part of China.

(The author is Associate Professor, IFMR, Chennai.)

A vision for the Indian Ocean

A vision for the Indian Ocean

byRajiv Bhatia

Though three recent developments in the region including piracy and terrorism are major challenges, New Delhi's conception of a suitable politico-strategic environment is fairly clear.

Recent developments in the Indian Ocean region demand attention. Look at a sample collection: Somali pirates, operating in waters off the Horn of Africa with impunity, are now coming closer to our coast; China has commissioned its first aircraft carrier; an Indian company's hydrocarbon exploration activity in Vietnam's waters is being contested by China; a former Japanese Prime Minister visiting Delhi calls for closer cooperation among “maritime democracies,” and every move by Beijing to cement its ties with our immediate neighbours is seen as vindication of the “string of pearls” theory.

India's ‘sea-blindness?'
These developments may seem baffling to northern India's land-centric view. Here, the combined legacy of Alexander and subsequent invaders who crossed the Himalayas is far more important than the rich history of the subcontinent's interaction, through the ocean route, with a vast region stretching from Aden to Bali. While a majority of people in the north have never seen a beach, people living south of the Vindhyas, especially in the southern States and on the east and west coasts, regard the Indian Ocean as a defining element of their destiny.

Having experienced India's centrality in the Indian Ocean region through visits to the Cape of Good Hope, Durban and Mombasa; Port Louis, Colombo and Gan — the southernmost island of Maldives; cities on Myanmar's southwestern flank and the coasts of Java and Bali, I am convinced that there can be no place for “sea-blindness” in our policymaking. Considerable scope, however, exists for developing a holistic approach if India wishes to cope with the challenges of the 21st century.

In order to fully appreciate the magnitude of our challenges, identifying recent trends in different subregions may be helpful.

The stakes in the area
In the western section of the Indian Ocean, three key developments, all negative from our viewpoint, are: piracy, terrorism, and the Chinese Navy's growing presence as part of the broader trend of China's expanding profile in Eastern and Southern Africa.

Piracy has attracted much attention and action. The Indian Navy has deservedly received considerable appreciation for its role in ensuring countermeasures. However, the expert opinion is that, in view of the expanding arc of piracy, much more needs to be done — on land, sea and elsewhere. On land, i.e. in Somalia — the epicentre of forces that gave birth to piracy — the Africans themselves have to resolve the issues, with more assistance from richer and deeply concerned member-states of the U.N. Action on the sea, ensuring the safety of maritime transport on which depends trade and energy security of so many countries, has to be taken by legitimate stakeholders. Action ‘elsewhere' should include measures that effectively reduce the attractiveness and sustainability of piracy as a flourishing industry.

Terrorism through the sea came knocking on India's doors on 26/11. Developments since then have augmented concern, not confidence. Experts worry about the security of our coastal cities, and offshore oil and gas installations. As regards Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean, they are no longer a subject of debate among think tanks. Governments have been factoring in the increased presence of the Chinese Navy. China's assertive approach in Africa contributed, at least partially, to renewed dynamism reflected in two India-Africa Forum Summits in three years.

Regarding India's immediate periphery, two key trends are now obvious. On the one hand, India's endeavour to promote cooperative bilateralism has begun to show positive results. On the other, Beijing continues to be ultra active in deepening its relations with principal South Asian countries such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar, besides Pakistan — all located in the Indian Ocean region. These countries are happy playing both the ‘China card' and the ‘India card' to leverage their gains, but they need to promote the interests of South Asia as a whole too. In the eastern theatre of the Indian Ocean, the situation is becoming progressively complex and dangerous as a result of reverberations of China's aggressiveness in the South China Sea. While piracy and terrorism are manageable there, the critical question facing the subregion is: will China and its immediate neighbours ranging from Japan to Thailand chart a pattern of relations marked by cooperation or conflict? India has obviously immense stakes in the answer, and in contributing to the region's collective hopes for peace and stability. Fortunately, this subregion has an elaborate ASEAN-centric institutional architecture for dialogue and cooperation. Much hope is placed on the capability of these institutions to deliver effective results.

New Delhi's approach
New Delhi's conception of a suitable politico-strategic environment in the Indian Ocean is fairly clear. India wants neither a new cold war nor domination of the region by a single country. South Block rejects the view that an outside power is needed as “a sea-balancer” for the area. It envisages a region where stability and cooperation prevail, marked by maritime security for all and a collective ability to deal with sources of non-traditional security threats. Besides, India is set to enhance its hard power and also deploy soft power assets to deepen its links with littoral states.

In this context, several points are noteworthy. First, in the Indian Ocean's western region, India's effort has been to strengthen defence cooperation with island states — Mauritius, Madagascar and Seychelles, besides Maldives. This exercise, still in an early phase, could do with acceleration. Second, under the overall umbrella of the IBSA Dialogue Forum, cooperation among the navies of the three member-states — India, Brazil and South Africa — through joint exercises, training and strategising has been gaining momentum. The two previous trilateral exercises took place in Cape Town and Durban. The resultant synergy should guide these countries to engage other interested parties by holding more exercises on the eastern seaboard of Africa.

Third, since the western segment of the Indian Ocean has limited institutional arrangements for dialogue and cooperation compared to the eastern theatre, many believe it is time to reinvigorate the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). Bold words were uttered by the Ministry of External Affairs at a seminar in Delhi in May. They need to be matched by action with India as chair of this underutilised organisation.

Fourth, India's bilateral cooperation on strategic issues needs to be strengthened with seven countries in the eastern theatre — Myanmar, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan and Australia. Some may term them a ‘potential necklace of diamonds.' However, the proposed cooperation among “maritime democracies” will merit consideration only if it is not a proxy for an anti-China alliance. For cementing collective endeavours to make the Indian Ocean and its periphery safe, India's preference should be to utilise the existing institutions, especially the East Asia Summit.

The way ahead
Diplomacy can help a country achieve its goals when if it is backed by strength. This time-tested dictum and a dispassionate study of the strategic environment drive India to provide the necessary resources for the modernisation of the Indian Navy. Admiral Vishnu Prakash, a retired Navy Chief, has made a persuasive case for this viewpoint, in a recent policy paper by the National Maritime Foundation. He urges India to develop and articulate “a maritime vision for itself and the neighbourhood.” His wise conclusion is: “The time has come for India to craft a new balance of power equation in order to safeguard its core interests and values.”

(The author is a former Ambassador.)
source:the Hindu

The forgotten history of Indian troops in China

by Ananth Krishnan

Source: The Hindu  

A photograph from the Shanghai Museum shows Sikh soldiers on duty in Shanghai. Photo courtesy: Colonel G. Jaishankar

For 55 days, the Boxers laid siege to the heart of Beijing.

The rebels, mainly young Chinese farmers and workers, kept more than 400 foreigners holed up in Beijing’s Foreign Legation Quarter. The siege was the dramatic denouement of months of anti-Imperialist and anti-Christian sentiment that swept across China at the turn of the 20th century. Known as the Boxer Rebellion, the events cast a long shadow on Chinese history throughout the 20th century, invoked by later nationalists in their own fight against Imperialism.

The history of the Boxer Rebellion is well known. What isn’t is the crucial role played by troops from British India in lifting the siege, which eventually paved the way for the occupation of Beijing by foreign troops.

Indian regiments made their way to the foreign quarter “crawling through the Imperial sewage canals”, undetected by the Boxers, and were the first troops to come to the aid of the besieged foreigners.

The lifting of the siege was one of only several key instances where Indian troops left an unlikely mark on the course of Chinese history in the early twentieth century.

This forgotten history of regiments from British India has been retraced by Colonel G. Jaishankar, who is currently serving as the Defence Attaché in the Indian Embassy in Beijing.

“Our leaders have been talking about ancient historical and cultural links, but little is known about the far more recent history of Indian troops in China,” he said in Beijing on Wednesday, at a presentation on the history of Indian regiments in China.

On August 4, 1900, a relief force of more than 3000 soldiers from Sikh and Punjabi regiments left Tianjin, part of the larger eight-nation alliance that was dispatched to aid the besieged quarter, where 11 countries had set up legations. Indian troops were also dispatched to guard churches and Christian missionaries, the targets of the Boxer uprisings.

Among the Indians, there was sympathy for the Boxers, Colonel Jaishankar said. Gaddhar Singh, a Rajput who was in Beijing in 1900-01, empathised with Chinese grievances in his accounts, arguing it was an entirely justified peasant rebellion.

The British also dispatched Indian regiments to China leading up towards the Opium War, which ended with the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 and the opening up of Chinese ports to the British.

The British deployed Sikh soldiers as law enforcement officers in ports like Shanghai, where their trading companies had set up a large presence by the early twentieth century. The Sikh soldiers were feared by the Chinese with their imposing figures, so much so that the British deemed that they did not even need guns when on duty, Colonel Jaishankar said, citing records from the time.

The history of Indian troops in China is one that is ignored in Chinese accounts, and is likely a sensitive legacy considering they were often deployed against the Chinese.

It is, nevertheless, a shared history that both countries should remember, Colonel Jaishankar said. “We should not run away from history,” he said. “But we are too swamped with recent events to take an objective look.”

Shared experiences

There were also positive lessons to be remembered by both countries with shared colonial experiences, he stressed.

An example is the Battle of Hong Kong during the Second World War, when Indian and Chinese troops fought together against the Japanese.

The 585 Indians who lost their lives are still remembered today in Hong Kong’s war cemeteries.

Another case in point was in 1994, when the Indian army returned a bell that was looted by British troops from Beijing’s Temple of Heaven when the city was ransacked by foreign troops following the Boxer Rebellion. The bell was later put up for display by the Chinese military.

“The Battle of Hong Kong was a unique event,” Colonel Jaishankar said. “That was the first time in history,” he noted, “that Indian and Chinese troops fought on the same side.”

56Rugged Pajero for jawans posted in Sikkim




The Indian Army brigade facing the Chinese in north Sikkim has an unusual vehicle in its inventory: Mitsubishi Pajeros! The vehicles were specially procured after observing similar vehicles used by Chinese military personnel on their side of the border.


The fact is northern Sikkim is no picnic. Over a distance of 60-70 km, the height rises from 15,000 feet to 19,000 feet. (The Chinese have it comparatively easier, they reach the same heights but rising gradually over 140 km). It puts considerable strain on army personnel not to mention vehicles and equipment. And given the poor state of roads there, the wear and tear is steep. Therefore the rugged Pajero.


It didn't come easily. Apart from the army's stringent procurement procedures, the mandarins in the Finance Ministry were reported to have had many objections. Nevertheless the proposal went through for an undisclosed number of Pajeros and they are doing yeoman service.


Oddly enough, the army appears less tense about the Chinese threat in Sikkim. The answer lies in the fact that units are sitting on the ridgelines and are able to spot any movement on the Chinese side. Then again the Chinese practice of stationing units 20 km from the border provides insurance against any surprise attack. Satellite cover is another insurance. The army also deploys artillery and tanks in depth to ensure adequate backup to the infantry. This is crucial given the problems involved in any air supply effort. There are no airfields in Sikkim, not because they're not required but engineers are yet to figure out how to get around the mountain ranges and lay a proper airfield. There are helipads but the logistics involved in moving tonnes of supplies or personnel at those heights tells heavily on equipment.


Border incidents appear to happen on a fairly regular basis, sometimes as often as every week. But these are rarely the "pushing shoving kind", or anything that degenerates into an armed confrontation. Army sources say that in the last 40 years no shot has been fired by either side. But the famous Finger Area is a bone of contention. The Chinese claiming the Indian border runs further south from its current position.


They are known to destroy stone cairns put up by the army to show where the Indian border begins. But many of these face offs are reportedly polite affairs, the Chinese anxious to make their point of view heard. Officers who have served in the area also say the Chinese tend to be very protocol conscious, the presence of a senior Indian army officer the occasion for an elaborate exchange of courtesies.


But there's no doubt the PLA is, as Defence Minister A K Antony puts it, "aggressively strengthening its capacities". So too is the Indian Army although comparatively our effort is slower, perhaps less focussed and always constrained by infrastructure and other hurdles.

source IBN Live

Babus block Indian Army’s plans to counter China’s PLA

Babus block Indian Army’s plans to counter China’s PLA

Published: Friday, Sep 16, 2011, 9:00 IST | Updated: Friday, Sep 16, 2011, 0:51 IST

By Saikat Datta & Mayank Aggarwal | Place: New Delhi | Agency: DNA

Indian Army’s plans to beef up presence on the Indo-China border have met with fierce resistance from two unexpected quarters — the finance and the environment ministries.

The finance wing of the defence ministry in consultation with the ministry of finance is not agreeable to spend a whopping Rs12,000 crore to set up a Mountain Strike Corps even as a plan to create an alternate, all-weather route from Siliguri to North Sikkim to rush troops to the Indo-China border has been rejected by the ministry of environment and forests on the grounds that the alignment passes through eco-sensitive areas.

Left with almost no options, the army headquarters is now planning to move in an independent armoured brigade into North Sikkim to try and maintain some muscle on one of its most sensitive border. According to sources in South Block, which houses the ministry of defence, the army is all set to induct the tank brigade by December 31 this year.

The proposal to beef up the army’s force on the Indo-China border comes at a time when the US Pentagon has reported that China was training two divisions in high altitude warfare. The idea to raise a dedicated mountain strike corps as a bulwark against China was mooted in the aftermath of the disastrous Operation Parakram, when the Indian army mobilised after the December 13 attack on Parliament.

At that time, the then army chief, Gen NC Vij, had ordered a comprehensive review of the army’s offensive and defensive posture. Headed by the then Western Army Commander, Lt Gen JJ Singh, the study group had recommended a mountain strike corps to be created for the Indo-China border.

The study group was unambiguous that a dedicated mountain strike corps is essential to maintain deterrence against the Chinese. “We must have a mountain strike corps in the sector if we need to maintain a strong deterrent posture,” Gen Vij told DNA.

As army chief he had pushed for a major reorganisation of the military structure to prepare for all exigencies on the Pakistan and China fronts.

“Ideally, the strike corps should have the full paraphernalia to launch a strike by troops who are already there and fully acclimatised in the high altitude areas. At those heights we need infantry, artillery, logistics and armoured brigades to strike back if someone was to plan a misadventure. Our current force levels are quite inadequate and it takes years to build up a new army corps in the area,” Gen Vij told DNA.

In fact, army headquarters was at pains to explain to the government that most of the army corps that came up as a reactive measure was too little, and too late. The Sukhna-based 33 Corps (in Darjeeling) came up after the 1962 defeat at the hands of the Chinese and Leh-based 14 Corps came up after the surprise Pakistani intrusions in Kargil.

The study group looked at the combined threat from Pakistan and China in a future war and concluded that the bulk of the fighting would take place in the high mountains.

“We found that current force position was woeful. Every Corps is supposed to have at least three army divisions and we were already short of 4 divisions. So not only did we feel the need to fill the void but also have a credible deterrent against China,” a senior officer familiar with the secret study told DNA.

“Our current military strategy against China is of dissuasion. But we need to upgrade it to deterrence for which we need at least two mountain strike corps,” said Brig Gurmeet Singh (Retd), director of the prestigious think-tank, CLAWS.

But the finance wing of the defence ministry after consultations with the finance ministry shot down the proposal on the grounds that funds were not available for such a massive project. This is a double barrel blow to the army’s plans to beef up its strength vis-a-vis China because the proposal to have an alternate route from Siliguri to the border has been opposed by the environment ministry.

Documents available with DNA show that the army had proposed three alternate routes to Aritar in North Sikkim- one starting from Khunia More in north Bengal, another from Bagrakot and a third from Damdim. The environment ministry has pointed out that at least two routes “will result in irreversible loss of bio-diversity vitality and vigor thereby affecting adversely the entire eco-system.” Stuck between environment and financial constraints, the Indian army is still years away from a credible deterrence against an aggressive China.

China maps Brahmaputra, Indus

Ananth Krishnan

Chinese scientists have completed a first of its kind study to pinpoint the sources of the Brahmaputra and Indus rivers using satellite images, and have found that the length and drainage areas of both rivers exceeded earlier estimates.

Researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), an official think-tank in Beijing, used remote-sensing satellite images and data from several expeditions to the Tibetan plateau to map the sources of the Brahmaputra, Indus, Salween and Irrawaddy rivers.

They located the source of the Brahmaputra, or Yarlung Tsangpo as it is known in Tibet, on the Angsi glacier on the northern side of the Himalayas, in the Tibetan country of Burang. The source of the river was earlier thought to be on the Chemayungdung glacier, further south.

The CAS study has mapped the river's length at 3,848 km, while earlier studies had estimated its length at 2,900-3,350 km. It also measured its drainage area at 712,035 sq km, with earlier estimates ranging from 520,000 sq km to 1.73 million sq km.

“Previously, the sources of the four rivers were never clearly designated, and differing accounts regarding their lengths and drainage areas confused researchers for many years due to restrictions of natural conditions and surveying and mapping technologies,” Liu Shaochuang, a researcher with the Institute of Remote Sensing Applications at CAS, was quoted as saying by the State-run Xinhua news agency.

Mr. Liu said the Indus river's headstream was mapped near Mount Kailash in Tibet, 30 km away from where its source was earlier thought to be. He said his study calculated the river's length at 3,600 km, exceeding earlier estimates of 3,200 km.

Mr. Liu's team used remote-sensing images provided by the U.S. Landsat satellite and the French SPOT satellite to map the Qinghai-Tibet plateau. He said the study would be “of great significance” to environmental researchers.

It, however, remains unclear if CAS will make the studies available to Indian researchers. Chinese institutes have been reluctant to share glacial and hydrological data citing strategic reasons, and have, in the past, balked at entering into agreements with Indian institutes.

India and China will, in coming months, hold talks to renew an agreement on sharing flood-related hydrological data on the Brahmaputra. Last year, the two countries signed an agreement to share data from June 1 to October 15 until 2012, based on an earlier MoU signed in 2008.

Indian officials have also called on China to release more information about its plans to develop hydropower projects on the river's upper and middle reaches. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said earlier this month India “trusts” China's statements that “nothing will be done that affects India's interest”, but would also “verify” Chinese claims.

In November, China started damming the middle reaches of the river to begin construction of a 510 MW run-of-the-river hydropower project.

The dam at Zangmu is the only one of 28 proposed hydropower projects on the river that has been approved by the Chinese government. Chinese hydropower groups have been lobbying the government to give the go-ahead for other dams.

source:The Hindu

Eastern promises, western fears

Siddharth Varadarajan

  

PTI During the recent visit to India by Chinese premier Wen Jiabao (seen with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh), the two countries discussed the promising new areas of cooperation that should be actively pursued. File photo

Indians may be suspicious of China and the Chinese of India. But it is the West which does not want to accept the strategic consequences of a rising Asia.

Behind the heavy typeface that the release of confidential American diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks has generated lie smaller stories which sometimes tell us more about the way in which our world is changing than the headlines themselves.

The U.S. ambassador in Paris met Michel Rocard, a former Prime Minister of France, in October 2005 for one of those sweeping, freewheeling chats that Gallic statesmen evidently specialise in. The bulk of the conversation deals with the French political scene but at the end, M. Rocard shares his concerns about the place of France and the United States in the new world order and proposes a joint Euro-American think-tank to prepare for the future. “Speaking of the growth of India and China, along with all the other challenges confronting both of us,” the leaked cable quotes the senior French politician as saying, “We need a vehicle where we can find solutions for these challenges together — so when these monsters arrive in 10 years, we will be able to deal with them.”

So there we have it. Even as the Indian elephant and Chinese dragon circle each other warily, wondering how each will cope with the rise of the other, the Occidental mind which has enjoyed dominating the world and the global commons for two centuries is worrying about how to deal with the combined arrival of these two “monsters.”

Happily for the West, the arrivistes are not exactly on the best of terms with each other. India is too wary of China's rise to exploit the opportunities this ascent provides. For its part, Beijing — which alternates between feigning indifference towards New Delhi and fretting over whether it might join hands with a “democratic bloc” led by Washington — is so self-absorbed that it is unable to harness the externalities that India's rise has generated in the region.

In a recent article, Kishore Mahbubani spoke of the triangular relationship between India, China and the U.S. and noted how the U.S. had better relations with both India and China than the two Asian giants had with each other. By being in the middle, he argues, Washington has a strategic edge. It also has an incentive to ensure a certain amount of tension between India and China, so as to cement its own presence in Asia as an offshore balancer.

Though Mahbubani does not say so, it would be naïve to imagine the problems the Indian and Chinese sides have with one another are the product of an American conspiracy. The fact is that India and China do not know each other well and have not paid enough attention to understanding the social, political and economic dynamics of the other. As a result, misperceptions and misunderstandings abound and have given rise to suspicions and even fear. That is why it is essential that a continuous and wide-ranging dialogue take place between different stakeholders: officials, politicians, the military, scholars, journalists, artists and others. Above all, there must be engagement on the big strategic questions of our time.

In a series of interactions held recently in Beijing at the initiative of the Observer Research Foundation and the International Department of the Communist Party of China, Indian and Chinese analysts had a surprisingly frank exchange of views on the state of the bilateral relationship, the problem areas and the new areas for potential China-India cooperation.

From the Chinese side, a number of scholars spoke of four specific problem areas with India. There is, first and foremost, the unsettled boundary and the fact that border territories are disputed. Second, the presence of the Dalai Lama and the so-called ‘Tibetan government in exile' is seen as a continuing irritant, especially in the aftermath of the disturbances which shook Lhasa and some other Tibetan pockets in China in 2008. Third, and this was surprising, the scholars acknowledged that China's friendship with Pakistan was a source of friction with India. And though they differed from the Indian side in characterising the current nature of the relationship, they acknowledged the fact that “balancing India” used to be a primary Chinese motive in the past. Their argument was that the rise of the Indian economy in the past decade has forced Chinese policymakers to de-hyphenate their South Asian policy. Finally, many of the Chinese interlocutors spoke of growing strategic suspicions that are made worse by a trust deficit. “Many people in China believe Indians look down upon them,” a professor from the International Relations department of Renmin University said. “India sees itself as close to the West and is willing to be used by the U.S. in its desire to become a world power.” Other scholars echoed the same view in different ways — that India might become part of an American-led effort to gang-up against China, that many in India subscribe to the ‘China threat' thesis.

My own assessment is that the boundary dispute and Dalai Lama are not major problem areas. Indeed, my suspicion is that part of the recent brittleness in the relationship is the product of artificially accelerated efforts to settle the boundary question. As for the Tibetan spiritual leader, it is true that his presence in India is a red rag to those in China who see him as working against the unity and integrity of their country. But the Chinese side can also well appreciate the consequences of his being asked to leave India. A Hollywood exile for the Dalai Lama would only serve to raise the salience of the Tibetan issue globally. Besides, it is time China and India also start paying attention to what might happen to the Tibetan question once the present Dalai Lama is no more. And start engaging each other, and Bangladesh as the lowest riparian, on Tibetan water-related projects.

Responding to Indian queries on China's plans to harness the Brahmaputra, a scholar from the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations spoke of the need for the comprehensive development of Himalayan hydropower resources. Citing Indian projects in Bhutan as a positive model, he said India's trust deficit with its neighbours like Pakistan and Nepal was coming in the way of the development of hydropower.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, it is obvious that China and India have a crucial stake in the stability of that country and need to discuss between them what they can do to help the situation there. The Chinese side is well aware of the emerging ideological and institutional fault lines in Pakistan. If there is any country other than the U.S. that has the ability to exercise leverage over the Pakistani military, it is China. Until now, however, China has been reluctant to use its influence. For more than four decades, Chinese strategic thinking on Pakistan has been dominated by the need to ‘balance' India. But with India having outgrown South Asia and Pakistan in danger of imploding as the problem of extremism and terrorism slowly gets out of control, Beijing cannot afford to remain wedded to this anachronistic mindset.

On strategic issues too, the Indian and Chinese sides have much to talk about. India and China are both officially committed to an open, inclusive architecture for the Asia-Pacific region. Both also have a stake in the freedom of navigation. During the visit to India by Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, the two countries committed their navies to joint anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. A commitment was also made to discuss the wider issue of maritime security. These are all promising new areas of cooperation that should be actively pursued. One Chinese scholar spoke of the need for strategic transparency, another made a pitch to launch new security principles by updating the Panchasila concept. Of course, such an effort is unlikely to go beyond the reiteration of homilies unless China and India both recognise that the world and their own national profiles have moved on since the 1950s. It has become a cliché to say the world is big enough to accommodate the rise of India and China. Since the world is a finite place, this means those who are today squatting on strategic space despite their leases having run out will have to be displaced. Let the West have nightmares about demons and monsters. The elephant and the dragon cannot afford to be scared of each other.source:THE HINDU

The great game pantomime

by M. K. Bhadrakumar

  

WAY TO GROW: This Oct. 27, 2009 picture shows Indian, Chinese delegates holding a business meeting in Bangalore. Photo: V. Sreenivasa Murthy

Instead of crying over the amazing pace of development of Chinese territories across our borders, ask Chinese companies to come forward and invest in our border roads.

The latest contribution to the discourse on China comes from Jaswant Singh, former External Affairs and Finance Minister. His opinion piece in the American media enjoins our strategic community's current discourse on the power dynamics in Asia. He is convinced that India has a “great game” on its hands and seems to imply that the outcome of this game will critically depend on its military prowess and its strategic alliance with the United States, whereas expanding Sino-Indian economic cooperation ultimately becomes inconsequential. Mr. Singh has articulated these views at an interesting point in the U.S.-India strategic partnership. To be sure, President Barack Obama's forthcoming visit to India gives them a sense of immediacy.

However, is there a great game in our region, and if so, is it as one-dimensional as Mr. Singh suggests? He says: “Rudyard Kipling's old ‘Great Game' now has new contestants. Instead of an expansionist Russian empire confronting Imperial Britain, it is now China hungry for land, water, and raw materials that is flexing its muscles, encroaching on Himalayan redoubts and directly challenging India.”

It may seem an esoteric historical detail in current polemics, but thanks to able historiography in the West, we now know that Imperial Britain exaggerated the “perception of threat” from Czarist Russia with the purpose of expanding its own influence in India and in the regions to the southwest in a wide arc that stretches from Cairo to China's Xinjiang — Greater Middle East. There is a spellbinding book by David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, which Jawaharlal Nehru would have acquired for our Parliament library had been alive today. Unlike Kipling's fiction, Fromkin provides calm, meticulously researched conclusions on Imperial Britain's strategy leading to the great Middle East settlement of 1921 — and the immense vistas of decades of history that provided its backdrop.

What makes Fromkin's world of yesterday absolutely fascinating is that the world of today bears striking similarities. Then too, as the decline of the Ottoman Empire began accelerating, there was a furious struggle for geopolitical space (and resources) among the established and emerging powers in Europe. There were great anxieties as a revolution was erupting with an obscure ideology amid convulsions of social unrest that were threatening to breach the dam in the established powers and which had no easy solutions.

The great game today, too, is a pantomime. The U.S. moves into Middle Asia to get embedded in a region which it historically never accessed — and couldn't access so long as the Soviet Union existed. These U.S. moves are, like Kipling's fiction, easy to dissimulate but the geo-strategic thrust is barely disguised: get embedded in a region that holds multitrillion dollars worth of mineral resources, and which overlooks 4 nuclear powers (potentially 5), three of which are emerging powers that may at some point, inevitably, see the raison d'etre of getting together in a post-Bretton Woods world order. Mr. Singh loses the plot.

He asserts: “The Chinese urge is to break from the confines of their country's history, and thus China's own geography. An assertive and relatively stable China, it seems, must expand, lest pent-up internal pressures tear it apart.” This is taking a walk fearlessly into terrains where Sinologists fear to tread. The point is China is a neighbour and even if a neighbour is not tailor-made for us, we have to live with it. And that can commence only by knowing our neighbour without pride and prejudice. The well-known American historian and author, Jeffrey Wasserstrom (who edits The Journal of Asian Studies), also happened to amble across these tricky terrains last week. Whereas Mr. Singh is self-confident, Prof. Wasserstrom is unsure about the great ambivalences in the Chinese story. I need to quote him at some length:

“One way to interpret China' elevated rhetoric … is as another indication that Chinese leaders have grown supremely self-confident and are eager to throw their weight around. The reality, though, is more complex … words and deeds are often shaped by a mixture of insecurity and cockiness … Of course, there are moments when China's leaders do seem like people who know that they are succeeding and want others to acknowledge it.

“And yet, when news broke last month that China had officially replaced Japan as the world's second-largest economy, instead of crowing about surpassing a long-time rival and having the top spot, held by the U.S. in its sights, the government issued statements emphasising that theirs remains a “poor, developing” country… Why, then, do China's rulers continue to backslide into doubt and fear, why do they seek to avoid having China labelled a superpower?

“China really is still a “poor” country in terms of per capita income. And parts of the country are more similar to sections of troubled “developing” countries than to China's showplace cities … Outsiders are increasingly convinced that China is a superpower, and that it needs to show that it can be a responsible one. But China's rulers only sometimes embrace the designation — and the [Chinese Communist] Party still sometimes behaves as if it had only a tenuous hold on power.”

Of course, it is an extraordinary intellectual challenge facing Indians to comprehend China. To compound it, we base opinions on dogmas and beliefs. Don't trade and investment constitute “constructive engagement” and become “CBMs”? There is a Chinese proposal today that they desire to build nuclear power plants in India — yes, maybe even bigger than the ones in Pakistan — having been India's “strategic partner” historically in the nuclear field. Somehow, our gurus are missing out on the quintessence of history and diplomacy, something our Chief Ministers in Karnataka and Gujarat who frequent China seem to grasp better — that good politics is about creating wealth.

If we are savvy, instead of sitting on the ground and crying about the amazing pace of development of Chinese territories across our borders, ask Chinese companies to come forward and invest in our border roads, too. According to Kamal Nath, China is prepared to increase threefold its present investments in our infrastructure sector. Why can't China build a world-class container terminal near Thiruvananthapuram so that we won't end up depending on the Colombo port, which China is expanding? The Sri Lankans seem to anticipate better the acute infrastructural problems of the Indian economy as it moves into a dazzling trajectory of growth.

The recent U.S. Senate testimony by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on China following his consultations with the Chinese leadership, including President Hu Jintao, provides a fascinating essay in realpolitik. Mr. Geithner said: “We [U.S.] have very significant economic interests in our relationship with China… [China's] efforts to encourage growth led by domestic demand ultimately mean more demand for American goods and services… [U.S. investment] in China provides a major channel through which U.S. exports flow, and as a result contributes to creating jobs here at home at our exporting firms … China has a very substantial economic stake in access to the U.S. market … And we have a very strong interest … in the Chinese market, so that U.S. businesses and U.S. workers do not face unfair trading practices. I want to be clear: a strong and growing China benefits the United States.”

Mr. Geithner, a personal friend of Mr. Obama, is pondering how China makes butter and how they can make butter together. There can be differences of opinion over what should be our appropriate and principled response to the Chinese way of making butter. Yet, today, there is so much for Indians to know: how, for a start, China is beginning to climb from low-end assembly lines and sweatshops to green technology and wind turbines and solar panels and electric cars. As Orville Schell, director of Asia Society's Centre on U.S.-China Relations, put it recently: “The first priority is to get our own house in order, so we're not filled with so much anxiety that is easily transferred on to the rise of another country.”

The pity is, just the wrong people could exploit Mr. Singh's plain thesis: middlemen for American arms manufacturers. India has a need to modernise its armed forces for meeting the new security challenges and “asymmetrical” wars that we may (or may not) fight. But we don't want to be hustled into things. Look at the contemporary politics of power. Saudi Arabia is embarking on a $60-billion dollar arms deal with the U.S.

The Obama administration admits that the deal will generate thousands of new jobs in America.

In the run-up to the arms deal, the arms manufacturers and their middlemen whipped up nerve-wracking xenophobia regarding a growing “Iranian threat.” Meanwhile, the U.S. is inching towards normalisation with Iran. China is a serious challenge to the U.S. and the challenge is increasingly how to tap into China's growth. Mr. Obama's ultimate focus is on butter, how to make more butter in America — with the Chinese brought into that enterprise.

(The writer is a former diplomat.)

source: The Hindu

BJP’s Fact Finding Committee warns against Chinese incursions

By Pramod Kumar

"CHINA has built 13 airports at the border and most of them including Lhasa, Qando, Nyngchi, Ngaji and Xigaza are operational now. Apart from rail links it has also established several missile points there. It has constructed metalled roads up to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and has reportedly deployed two lakh army personnel on the border. It has the potential to move two more divisions to forward areas during emergency. On the other hand there are virtually no metalled roads on Indian border and more distinctly in those areas which are under threat. There are just wind sandy rubble tracks which Indian security forces are using today. Such a road system in no way can serve our requirements during war time. This state of affairs exists both in Eastern and Western sectors of India," reveals a latest study of Indo-China border conducted in Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh and Sikkim by a high powered Fact Finding Committee of BJP leaders.

The report further reveals: "China now has 40,000 km road network in Tibet, apart from rail links of 1,118 km, one from Lhasa to Gormo in Qinghai province. This would enable China to mobilise large forces by train and by road onto Indian borders.

Earlier, this exercise not only took a long time but also was impossible during winter but the new rail line into Tibet and the expressway have changed the scenario totally."

The Committee was constituted by Shri Nitin Gadkari on January 29 to investigate and compile a dossier on the reported incursions by Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on Indian soil. It has already visited the border areas in Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh and Sikkim and will shortly visit Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh before submitting a final White Paper. BJP spokesperson and Rajya Sabha MP Shri Rajiv Pratap Rudy, Lok Sabha MP Shri Rajan Sushant, former MP and national secretary Shri Tapir Gao and former J&K BJP president Dr Nirmal Singh were other members of the committee.

"The issue of infrastructural developmental in border areas has totally been neglected even after humiliating defeat of 1962. Today, the presence of Chinese army at the border is three to five times more than the Indian army. It must be taken seriously," said Shri Bhagat Singh Koshyari, team leader of the Fact Finding Committee.

The committee submitted its report to BJP president Shri Nitin Gadkari at the party’s National Executive Meeting in Patna on June 12. The report demanded the Central government to immediately make the recommendations of China Study Group on Infrastructure Development public and also implement the Group’s recommendations expeditiously. Stressing the need to set up a Parliamentary Group for detailed study and overseeing the border issues, the Committee said a statutory high powered autonomous border management group should be constituted at the national level.

India shares 4,056 kms of boundary with China divided into three sectors-Eastern, Western and Middle. In the Eastern Sector China claims an area of 94,700 sq. kms in addition to whole of Arunachal Pradesh and some parts of Sikkim as its territory. The Western Sector comprises the area of Aksai Chin and the Western boundary in Ladakh, is located along the Lanka La, Niagzu stream and Demchok and Teshigong through the Emis Pass, which was originally under the control of Ladakhi kings. Aksai Chin is strategic to China to sustain control over Tibet. Here China claims about 38,000 sq kms of land in Aksai Chin. In the Middle Sector the area extends up to Spiti Valley and Shipkila Pass. In Garhwal area of Uttarakhand, Satluj-Ganga

watershed has been the traditional boundary. Here China claims about 1,300 sq kms as their territory. After 1962 war, China illegally occupied 20,000 sq kms in Arunachal Pradesh and 38,000 sq kms in Ladakh region, excluding 5,180 sq kms area ceded to it by Pakistan in 1963.

The committee visited Eastern Sector-Tawang, Zemithang, Bumla in Arunachal Pradesh-from March 23 to 28. It found that the Thagla Ridge, where the 1962 Indo-China war had begun, Namka Chu and Sumdrong Chu Valley are under Chinese occupation since 1986. As a result lot of traditional grazing land of local people has been lost. Even an important and sacred Buddhist statue has been displaced by the Chinese Army. In Central Arunachal Pradesh under Upper Subansiri district, the Asa-Pila-Maya Army camp which was in Indian territory is now under Chinese occupation. Similarly, in the eastern part of Arunachal Pradesh under Dibang Valley district, the Athu-Pupu range, an important sacred place for local people, is now under Chinese occupation since 2006. In Chaklagam range in eastern part, three mountain ranges frequented by Indian hunters have also been occupied by China in 2006. Similarly, in Kurung Kumey district seven of the nine army base camps have been occupied by Chinese Army.

In the Western Sector in Ladakh which was visited from April 1 to 4, the committee realised the urgent need to improve conditions of roads and also the requirement of advanced surveillance equipments. The committee found that the Chinese are far ahead of India in this regard in this region. Now they need not patrol the border all the times. They have advanced equipments with the help of which they can take action immediately in an emergency. The Chinese have also intruded in Mangyur in Demchok area, opposite to Dungti post, Chumar in Nyoma block, places near Pengong Lake, etc. Here certain posts are unmanned and some are unduly spaced as there is no post within 40 km and the Jaarsar post is 8 km from the LAC.

During its visit to Eastern Sector in Sikkim from May 30 to June 1, the committee witnessed the absence of even basic road right from Gangtok to the border posts. Even after 60 years of Independence the abysmal facilities are a telling story of the Indian side. It is not only roads, even the basic telecom communication is absent beyond Lachen. It was for the first time that any civilian/non-uniformed personnel ventured to visit the East Changeri Post 18,000 ft with only six per cent oxygen level. At this location virtually no vehicles can ply and diesel genset cannot be used for power.

The committee emphasised on the immediate need to create new posts to man the gaps at different points to stop incursion. For this purpose, the strength of Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) should be increased. It also stressed the urgent need to increase Army’s strength to match deployment on Chinese side of the border. "The Government must take up construction of pucca (metalled) roads on priority basis before it is too late. There is also urgent need of making the Advance Landing Grounds (ALGs) at Chushul and Furchok workable. The Government should also speed up construction of Airports in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim," the report added.

Stressing the need to boost the morale of ITBP by improving living conditions of the personals the report suggested to involve the local people in guarding the border by recruiting them in Territorial Army. "In Ladakh area, there seems to be lack of coordination between the security forces and the local administration to deal with border issues. Similarly, there seems to be lack of communication between the security forces and the local people. The people say the ITBP doesn’t trust them. The local Riboos (grazers) will play a vital role when the question of deciding the boundary will come. We suppose that they shall be one of the deciding factors as their claim over the land under their occupation shall not be so easy to ignore. So, it is imperative on the part of security agencies to improve relations with them," the report said suggesting to open the Ladakh region for tourists, as it will also reduce the travel distance to Kailash Mansarovar to less than a half. In ancient time this was the familiar route to Kailash Mansarovar.


source: The Organiser

A “zhengyou” relationship with China

by Vidya Subrahmaniam

During Pratibha Patil's recent visit to China, both sides celebrated the Copenhagen spirit and affirmed to take the relationship beyond bilateral to global cooperation.

At the Asia Hotel in Beijing, Ma Jisheng, an official with the information department of the Foreign Ministry, was declaiming on millennia-old India-China relations. Suddenly he flung aside the prepared text and announced that he would speak straight from the heart: “Would the media on both sides please give India and China a chance to develop normal relations?”

The official's point was simple. Attitudes hardened when the media sensationalised issues, and the events of 2009, when bilateral relations reached a precipitous low following media frenzy and scare-mongering, proved as much. “This constant harping on border, visa and other things, is it not like eating the same food everyday?” Mr. Ma asked plaintively, adding, “I cannot help but think sometimes that China and India would solve their problems if only the media kept quiet a bit.”

The Indian media delegation accompanying President Pratibha Patil had looked upon the Asia Hotel lunch as little more than an interlude in an itinerary packed with ceremonial welcomes, meetings, inaugurations, receptions and so forth. Ornamental phraseology and practised rhetoric are the stuff of such visits, and we were naturally taken aback by Mr. Ma's plain speaking. Perhaps he was being free and frank because we were not officials but the media?

Yet as the tour — organised to coincide with the landmark 60th anniversary of the establishment of India-China diplomatic relations — progressed, it was evident that even at the highest level of the Chinese leadership there was a degree of candour and responsiveness that took the Indian side by surprise. As the presidential outing drew to a close, both sides seemed to concur that Ms Patil's visit had gone beyond the perimeter of goodwill ambassadorship to generate tangible positives for the future. A highly placed Indian official told The Hindu: “I read the visit as a clear Chinese signal to have better relations with us.”

It certainly helped that Ms Patil arrived in Beijing at a time when India-China relations were seen to be on the mend after a difficult year characterised by intense mistrust on both sides. The irritants seemed daunting enough on their own: China's angst over the Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh, and the Indian unhappiness at stapled visas, not to mention apprehensions over Chinese-assisted construction in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). But aided by irresponsible speculation on an upcoming war, they began to look insurmountable. In July 2009, the editor of an Indian defence magazine prophesied that China would attack India by 2012. A month later, a so-called Chinese strategist posted a web article that argued that China with some effort could indeed balkanise India.

Neither of the articles was officially authorised. Yet, together, they assumed a life of their own with commentators in India hyperventilating about China's hidden agenda, and the Chinese media and think tanks contributing their bit to the rising hysteria.

While it may be difficult to locate the precise point when tensions began to ease up, analysts on both sides agree that India and China were well served by the “Copenhagen spirit.” This is a euphemism for the exemplary cooperation witnessed in the Danish capital during the December 2009 Climate Change summit. India and China so finely coordinated their negotiating positions at the talks that the online edition of the German magazine, Der Spiegel, was provoked to put out an article, “How India and China sabotaged the UN Climate Summit.”

The summit revealed the humongous potential of India-China cooperation on international platforms. Given the size of either country's population and economy, India and China are intimidating enough individually. Together their might could be staggering. Not surprisingly, Copenhagen became a metaphor for forward movement at the 2010 India-China Beijing talks. Ms Patil and President Hu Jintao agreed that the Asian neighbours were now ready to move beyond bilateral engagement to consider cooperation at international groupings and venues, among them G-20, Doha and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China).

The enlarged scope of cooperation was brought up again on the last day of talks by Vice-President Xi Jinping, who made several significant points. First, he declared that India and China were ripe for a “new start.” Second, he reiterated the prospects for global cooperation between the Asian neighbours. Third, he pointed out that between them China and India boasted a combined population of 2.6 billion. The imagery would overawe anyone: Two fastest growing economies with close to 40 per cent of the global population acting in tandem. That Mr. Xi followed this up by attending the 60th anniversary celebrations of India-China relations held at a local hotel was not missed by the Indian side. Mr. Xi is not just any Vice-President. Though currently fifth in the Chinese leadership hierarchy, he is widely tipped to succeed Mr. Hu, which invests his words with weight and value. Mr. Xi's presence at the reception was noteworthy because the usual practice is to send Ministers to such functions.

Indian Foreign Ministry officials counted other factors which lent that special touch to the presidential visit. Ms Patil had an audience with each member of the leadership hierarchy — besides Mr. Hu and Mr. Xi, she met Chairman of the National People's Congress Wu Bangguo, Premier Wen Jiabao and Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Jia Qinglin. This is considered a rare honour for a visiting head of state.

Through the visit, the two sides seemed to have firmed up a formula, slowly evolving over meetings between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Chinese leadership, and now held up as the way forward: Manage the areas of conflict so that the relationship, rather than being held hostage to “one or two persisting issues,” could move forward to explore areas of global and bilateral cooperation.

Inevitably India's growing trade with China — China is India's largest trading partner with volumes targeted to reach $ 60 billion this year — figured prominently in the talks as did the fact that it was adversely balanced against India. President Patil missed no opportunity to speak for wider Indian access to Chinese markets. India's exports are currently restricted to primary and resource-based products such as iron ore and copper, with little opening available to core competence sectors like IT, pharma and engineering. In her speeches, Ms Patil stressed these as thrust areas for market development, and according to Indian officials, the Chinese team agreed that the trade imbalance was not sustainable. Said an Indian official: “The Chinese are minimal with their promises because they see them as commitment. The fact that at almost every forum they agreed to import more from us shows that they are very serious about trade.”

Yet with all the positives, the tour also showed how delicately poised the relationship is and how easily views can be shaped for or against China. So far, the Indian public opinion has alternated between exultation over Chindia and paranoia over imagined war threats. Chindia is an inappropriate coupling notwithstanding the growing prospects for India-China global joint action. China is far ahead of us on all indicators. On infrastructure and organising capacity, we must abandon all hopes of catching up — a truth that hit home when we saw the woefully inadequate Indian pavilion at the Shanghai expo.

As the presidential entourage flew into Beijing, the media mood was set by a report in the Guardian indicating huge Chinese diversion projects on the Brahmaputra. But thanks to excellent background briefing by the Indian side, which pointed to lack of evidence for the report, the accompanying media were prevented from blowing it up into “yet another Chinese threat.”

As against this, the media mood swing was overly positive on India's aspirations for a United Nations Security Council seat. Ms Patil did seek China's backing for it during her summit meeting with President Hu, and China did broadly indicate its support but the phraseology was far more nuanced than understood by the Indian media which drummed it up as “China backs India on UNSC seat.” Indeed, the omission of the “promised” UNSC seat from the Chinese Foreign Ministry statement issued the same day underscored the pitfalls of overinterpreting what Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao described as “a gradually developing relationship.” What official sources did convey later was that on the UNSC seat, “the Chinese were far more positive than they have been so far.”

Tibet provided some more media excitement on the last day of talks. Ms Rao and Ambassador S. Jaishankar were bombarded with questions: Did China raise Tibet? Just when we thought things were going fine, they brought up this irritant. Is this not unfair to us? MP Raghuvansh Prasad Singh, who was on the tour, added to the panic: “Heard they are singing the Tibet tune.” Tempers cooled down only after the Indian side explained that Tibet was on a checklist of queries China always raised in talks with India. The Indian side had a checklist too, and it was routine for both countries to go through the motions and allay each other's fears.

A top member of the Indian official delegation summed up India-China relations in terms of “pengyou” and “zhengyou.” “Pengyou” is a superficial friend. “Zhengyou” is a serious, real friend who will frankly admit to problems and work at overcoming them: “We have a zhengyou relationship with China.”

Indo-China Joint Workshop on National Action Plan on Climate Change

The Indo-China Joint Workshop on National Action Plan on Climate Change will begin here on 21st October 2009.China and India both have prepared National Action Plans. Considering the similarities of the Plan, it has been decided to have a Technical Workshop to share the experience on scientific, technical and policy aspects relating to climate change issues in India and China. In the Workshop Indian and Chinese Experts will deliver lecture on subjects which include National Action Plan in India and China, Policy and actions on mitigation, Policies and actions on forests, Policies and actions on adaptation and Progress in Climate Change Science.

A Bilateral Meeting between Shri Jairam Ramesh, Ministerof State for Environment & Forests (I/C), Government of India and Mr. XIE Zhenhua, Vice Chairman, Minister, National also be held. Senior Officers of the Government of China and India will also participate at this Meeting. During the Meeting discussions will be focussed on Domestic Initiatives; Issues in multilateral negotiations (mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer and finance), and outlook for Copenhagen Meeting.

A Memorandum of Agreement on Cooperation on Addressing Climate Change between the Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India will be signed by the Hon’ble Minister, Environment & Forests Shri Jairam Ramesh and by Mr. XIE Zhenhua, Vice Chairman, Minister, National Development and Reform Commission, China will be signed.This Agreement would strengthen the cooperative activities between China and India on mitigation, programmes, projects, technology development and demonstration relating to greenhouse gas emission reduction including energy conservation efficiency, renewable energies, clean coal, methane recovery and utilization, afforestation and sustainable management of forests and ecosystems, transportation and sustainable habitat. National Development and Reform Commission, China and Ministry of Environment & Forests will be designated authority for implementation of this Agreement.
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Pak-China collusive intimidation
By: Cecil Victor
New Delhi—Asia Defence News International (ADNI)

That August to October is a season of madness marked by the Chinese attack on India in 1962 and the mindless Pakistani attempt in 1965 to capture the rest of Jammu and Kashmir by using troops disguised as tribals as it did in 1947 is accentuated by the current spurt of hostilities in both J and K and along the Sino-Indian border. This time there appears to be a coordinated attempt by Beijing and Islamabad to intimidate India, If the turn of events leads to open hostilities India must chose the time and place most advantageous to its own troops rather than be rushed into an unequal contest. Common intent is seen in the first breach of the ceasefire along the Line of Control by Pakistani troops in a long time. It coincides with the aggressive posturing by China in Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh and, more recently, in the Aksai Chin flatlands of Ladakh and a recrudescence of infiltration by terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir. Clearly Islamabad does not want to go any further down the road as demanded by Washington in its campaign against the Taliban. The killing of Baitullah Mehsud with a US drone aircraft and accusations that Pakistan did not take advantage of the disarray that overtook the terrorist organization are other indicators that Pakistan wants a way out of having to fight the very terrorism that it helped nurture in the decades since the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops. Heavy shooting along the Line of Control could help it shed its commitments to the US. Aware of the gameplan India has kept a low profile so as not to give Pakistan the excuse it is seeking. The Chinese would want the infiltators to succeed but for that to happen Indian attention will have to be divered from the LoC. That is why the Aksai Chin sector has been reactivated and the painting with red letters on rocks is intended to send to the terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir the message that China is taking a hand in the proceedings. The Chinese series of provocative actions along the Line of Actual Control in the Himalayas is intended to prevent a diversion of well acclimatized troops Indian from the India-China border to the India-Pakistan area of confrontation. India is aware of this collusive intent and has already implemented plans to raise two brigades of infantry to bolster its presence against China. But it needs to trace its steps carefully lest Beijing, as it did in 1962 after Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai was being used by China to assert territorial control and it launched its massive attack. Nehru’s order came to be known as the “Forward Policy” of deployment of Indian troops and police along its claim lines. Beijing used this to its diplomatic advantage by projecting India as the aggressor. Indian military deployment in the Himalayas is far superior to what it was in 1960s as the Chinese discovered at Nathu La when it tried to get ratty after that.However there is needs to tread softly and diplomatically without walking into a trap of confrontation that Beijing is trying to provoke. Nonetheless, given the heady nature of the season at this time of the year, India should be prepared for aggressive action by its neighbours. This time it is happening in unison with malice aforethought. The signal for it was given when Pakistan Army chief General Ashfaq Kiyani visited Beijing and since then there has been a slow but steady escalation of tension India and her two neighbours. Calls for talks by Pakistan and China are subterfuges and camouflage for their joint intention of destabilizing India using a combination of terrorist and conventional military tactics.For both of them the jehadi terrorist organizatios tht constitute the United Jehad Council are the bedrock of their geopolitics in which Pakistan is the vanguard and the terrorists are their proxies. It is not for nothing that Beijing has invested so much in terms of nuclear weapons and the missiles for delivering them. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability is the shield from behind which the terrorist spear is hurled. It is not for nothing that at every occasion Pakistan should harp on its being a nuclear weapons power and that military confrontation could, very quickly, erupt into a nuclear exchange. It is baldfaced nuclear coersion particularly since it is the overtly stated policy of Pakistan to use nuclear weapons at short notice. For China, Pakistan is the last outpost in its policy of creating a “string of pearls” -- its euphemism for a series of military focal points for power projection the North Arabian Sea. It is no accident that the string encircles India like a garrotte intended to strangle it.

CHINA GLOBAL TIMES WARNS INDIA OF DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES

China’s Communist Party attacks India over border issue

China continued its verbal assault on India on Wednesday with the ruling Communist Party’s two official mouthpieces accusing India of “hegemonic” ambitions in South Asia and “provoking” China over the border dispute.

The People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s official newspaper, and the Global Times, an English-language paper run by the Party’s information department, launched a co-ordinated onslaught in their editorial pages on Wednesday, accusing the Indian government of “recklessness and arrogance”.

The People’s Daily said India was “obsessed” with a “hegemonic mentality”, had “turned a blind eye" to the concessions China had made over the border issue and "refused to drop the pretentious airs when dealing with neighbours like Pakistan”. The paper also accused India of following a policy of “befriend the far and attack the near”, saying that “resentment still simmered” from India's wars with China and Pakistan. “If India really wants to be a superpower, such a policy is short sighted and immature,” the editorial said.

The strong comments coming from China’s ruling Communist Party underscore how the atmosphere between the two neighbours has fast soured in recent months. Wednesday’s statements are a stark contrast from the conciliatory positions the two governments had seemed to adopt over the border dispute following the last round of talks in August, when officials in Beijing and New Delhi spoke of positive progress.

On Tuesday, China said it was “strongly dissatisfied” with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s recent visit to Arunachal Pradesh, part of which China has claims on. New Delhi responded saying it was both disappointed and concerned, and that China’s statement did not help in resolving the Boundary Question.

The People’s Daily, a nationalistic newspaper run by the Communist Party’s propaganda wing, often articulates the party's positions on foreign affairs in more strident tones than the official positions stated by the Chinese government's Foreign Ministry. In its editorial, the paper went beyond attacking the Indian government, saying “Indians have become more narrow-minded and intolerable of outside criticism”.

The paper claimed a “rising nationalist sentiment” in India led the country to “provoke” China on the border issue. “[India’s] dream of superpower is mingled with the thought of hegemony, which places the South Asian giant in an awkward situation and results in repeated failure,” the paper said.

The Global Times threatened India would make “a fatal error” if it mistook “China’s approach for weakness”. “The Chinese government and public regard territorial integrity as a core national interest, one that must be defended with every means,” the paper said. “The disputed border area is of strategic importance, and hence, India's recent moves — including Mr. Singh’s trip and approving past visits to the region by the Dalai Lama – send the wrong signal. That could have dangerous consequences.”

The papers also accused India of “ignoring” China’s “concessions” on the border issue, but did not specify what the concessions were.

Indian analysts say China’s positions on the boundary issue have, in fact, hardened in recent months, with Chinese objections to visits by Indian leaders to Arunachal Pradesh becoming more frequent and strong.

The Global Times also claimed 96 per cent of the over 6,000 respondents of an online poll on its Chinese language Website said they felt “agitated” by the frequent visits by Indian leaders the disputed area.

INDIAN MINISTER SPEAKS AT SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION

14 oct 2009
Following is the text of Minister’s speech:

“Let me begin by extending felicitations from the people and Government of India on the momentous occasion of 60 years of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. I am pleased to participate in this Meeting, taking the Shanghai Cooperation process forward. We deeply appreciate the arrangements and hospitality extended by our hosts. We are now into the fifth year of our association with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an Observer state and these years have been eventful and satisfying. We are happy that engagement of Observer states is progressively on the increase and hope that this continues to the mutual advantage of both Member and Observer states.

The recent Summit in Pittsburgh underlined the fact that a collective and inclusive approach is the best and probably only way of addressing these challenges. Excellencies, most of us represent developing countries, and in varying degrees, have been adversely affected by the global financial and economic crisis. The crisis began in the heart of capitalist world but its effects have been felt across the globe. However, thanks to the policies and programmes adopted by the Government with the support of the people, the effect was marginal in India. The need to revive the global economy is a complex challenge, requiring efforts from all of us. In such a scenario, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization can play an important role.

On the economic front, we can strengthen the linkages between us in the areas of trade, business exchanges and investment, as well as adopt mutually reinforcing monetary and fiscal policies. Sectors like energy, infrastructure, agriculture, banking, transportation, science and technology and education offer opportunities for substantive cooperation. India will be happy to participate in these activities. In addition to this, terrorism and the ideologies of exclusion and intolerance threaten to undo whatever we have achieved. All of us who have gathered here take pride in our civilisational values and cultural diversity. The terrorist attack in Mumbai was a grim reminder of the transnational nature of terrorism. It evoked widespread condemnation from the world community.

The time has come to adopt a policy of zero tolerance to terrorism. The need of the hour is to have greater cooperation, exchange of information and coordination. The SCO has made progress in the area of counter-terrorism and anti-drug trafficking measures. We have sought a mutually beneficial association with the Regional Counter Terrorism Structure based in Tashkent and are ready to complete the required formalities. We should also move towards early adoption of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.

As a Minister dealing with energy matters in the Government of India, I would also like to mention energy security which figures very high on each of our national agendas. We need to ensure stability and predictability of world energy markets. As SCO is a unique forum which has a mix of both energy producing and energy consuming countries, SCO countries can make an effective contribution towards a cooperative framework for ensuring energy security. In this context, we hope to see the SCO Energy Club take concrete shape and become a forum of discussion among SCO countries in this critical area. As a close neighbour, we wish the Shanghai Cooperation Organization all success in its diverse activities. There is a lot to be gained through strengthening connectivity between the SCO and India..

In conclusion, I wish to convey our deep appreciation to His Excellency Premier Wen Jiabao for the excellent arrangements made by the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Meeting”.

CAN INDIA GIVE CONCESSION IN EAST TO RESOLVE RELATIONS-S.RAGHVAN

··············· A s India's new foreign minister settles into office, a major issue demanding his attention will be the boundary newill be the boundary negotiations with China. Despite 13 rounds of discussions since 2003, an agreement seems as elusive as ever.

The key point of contention is China's claim to the Tawang area of Arunachal Pradesh. The parameters agreed upon in 2005 state that the final settlement "shall safeguard due interest of...settled populations in the border areas". This suggests that populated areas such as Tawang would not be up for bargaining, and yet, Beijing persists. To understand China's stance, it would be useful to view the dispute from a historical perspective.

During their talks in April 1960, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai indicated to Jawaharlal Nehru that if India accepted China's claims in the western sector (Ladakh and Aksai Chin), it would adopt a reasonable stance on the McMahon Line boundary in the eastern sector (now Arunachal Pradesh). Beijing, he clarified, could not accept the McMahon Line, but could agree to a slightly different boundary.

China's position in this sector stemmed mainly from the fact that the McMahon Line was the product of the Simla Convention of 1914, where Tibetan delegates had participated alongside British, Indian and Chinese representatives. Accepting the McMahon Line would be tantamount to acknowledging that Tibet had then enjoyed some sort of independent status--a point that would buttress the Dalai Lama's case for an independent Tibet.

Nehru, in turn, called for a sectorby-sector examination of claims. In the western sector, Beijing not only claimed Aksai Chin, but also areas south and south-west of the region. Although the Chinese had occupied some of these parts in 1959, they were not in control of the entire area they had claimed. China occupied all of this area only after 1962.

When talks on the dispute were revived in the 1980s, New Delhi stuck to the position of sector-wise negotiations. The assumption was that once China acceded to India's position in the east, it would politically be easier for the Indian government to make concessions in the west. Domestic politics also mandated that India should secure China's withdrawal from the 3,000 sq.
miles (around 7,770 sq. km) annexed in Ladakh in 1962, as the government could not afford to be seen as acquiescing to the gains of war.

China agreed to this approach, but began emphasizing its claims over Arunachal Pradesh--particularly the Tawang area. Beijing's calculations were straightforward. If concessions in one sector would not be linked to gains in another, it made sense to adopt a maximalist negotiating position on each sector.
Besides, the earlier considerations persisted as the Dalai Lama's campaign for independence gathered momentum; the Tibetan leader was increasingly active internationally.

The negotiations that began in 2003 departed from the previous attempts in important respects. India assented to the idea of a comprehensive settlement, encompassing all the sectors. The parameters of the 2005 talks took into account the positions of both parties and sought to reconcile them. New Delhi needed a Chinese withdrawal by at least 3,000 sq. miles in the west; Beijing sought some concessions in the east. India has repeatedly stated that uprooting settled populations would be unacceptable.

Territorial considerations apart, the Chinese evidently want India to provide tangible reassurance vis-àvis Tibet. Indeed, China's hardening stance on Tawang has mirrored its increasing concern about Tibet.

The protests in the run-up to the Olympics heightened these concerns. China's defence white paper released last year notes that Tibetan separatism is a major challenge. In tackling this problem, the Chinese believe that time is their best ally.
Once the Dalai Lama passes away, Beijing will be in a position to appoint his successor, and so neutralize the Tibetan problem. But their success in this attempt also hinges on their ability to cut to size the Tibetan émigré movement, with the most important target in this regard being the Tibetan government-inexile operating out of India.

Established in the early 1960s, the government-in-exile has ramified into a sizeable organization. India has not recognized the governmentin-exile and has declared that it does not permit the organization to undertake political activities. But Beijing is not convinced of New Delhi's sincerity. As Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated last year, Tibet remains a "sensitive" issue in China's relationship with India.

In fact, China's suspicion of India's support to Tibetan dissidents goes back to the late 1950s. The evidence now emerging from Chinese archives shows that this misperception was crucial in China's decision to go to war in 1962. Thus, as part of a settlement, China appears to seek some move by India to curb the Tibetan émigrés--possibly by dissolving the parliament-in-exile.

But the dispute can be resolved if both sides are willing to make com promises. India has space to make concessions in the unpopulated ar eas in the east; China can relinquish some territory in the west. Similarly, New Delhi can provide robust reas surances on Tibet without having to entirely fulfil Beijing's desires.
- Striking an accord on these lines will take time. Furthermore, selling the agreement in India's domestic political market is unlikely to be simple. A boundary agreement will require a constitutional amend ment, which will have to be ap proved by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament and by at least half the state legislatures.

The present government has the requisite political clout to settle this decades-old dispute. The question remains: Does it have the will?

Srinath Raghavan is associate fel low at the National Institute of Ad vanced Studies, Bangalore.

INDO-CHINA TRADE THRU NATHULA TO RESUME ON 4TH MAY 2009L

Gangtok:1 may 2009: Bilateral trade between Asian giants India and China will resume through the Nathu La pass in Sikkim on the famed Silk Route Friday, with the government promising traders a new mart near the border, officials said.
Nathu La is one of the three trading border posts between India and China, the other two being Shipkila in Himachal Pradesh and Lipulekh in Uttarakhand.
While the list of items allowed for the border trade will remain unchanged this season, traders can expect a new trade mart at the border, work on which has already been started, said Sikkim Industries Secretary M.G. Kiran.
"The central government has promised us Rs.8.5 crore ($1.7 million) to construct the mart. Of this, we have already received Rs.1 crore ($202,600)," Kiran said.
He also said the trade mart was coming up at Sherthang near Nathu La pass.
An eight-room hotel is also being built in the area primarily for Indian traders. The state industries authorities are also building a new car park and more shops as part of the mart.
The department is also planning to construct cargo space in view of the expected enhanced volume of trade this year. A check post is being built at the Nathu La border, where immigration and customs checks will be under one roof.
Kiran added that the construction work would be supervised and managed by the roads and bridges department of the state government.
The sluggish border trade between the two countries is due to restrictions in tradable items - India can import 15 items from China including silk, yak pelts and horses, and export 29 goods that include textiles, tea, rice, vegetables and herbs.
However, as the government has now provided most favoured nation (MFN) status to trade through the Nathu La route, the trade volume is expected to increase this season, officials said.
The two Asian giants in July 2006 reopened trade across the 15,000-feet (4,545-metre) Nathu La pass, 52 km east of Sikkim's capital Gangtok, as part of a broader rapprochement.
The move marked the first direct trade link between the nuclear-armed neighbours since a bitter border war in 1962.
Under an agreement reached between India and China, trade takes place four days a week - Monday to Thursday - beginning May each year and lasting until Nov 30, when snow closes down the pass.
Bilateral trade in 2006 through Nathu La saw business worth about Rs.20 lakh ($40,200), with Indian traders doing business worth about Rs.11 lakh ($22,250). In 2007, the volume of trade was to the tune of Rs.26 lakh ($52,100).
Although two-way trade was slow in the first three seasons, last year about 1,900 Chinese traders crossed the border separated by a rusty barbed wire marker to the bazaar of Sherathang, 5 km below the pass on the Indian side. The total trade stood at Rs.96 lakh ($194,400) in 2008.
About 1,200 Indian traders headed to the Renqinggang interim market in Tibet on the Chinese side, 16 km from the border, during the first three seasons. (IANS)