Dealing with ‘Grandpa Wen’

by G Parthasarathy

The Chinese Premier has a refreshingly open approach on contentious issues. But India must not be charmed into toeing a soft line on China

Prime Minister Wen Jiabao is one of the few Chinese leaders respected by his Indian interlocutors because of the refreshingly open approach that he adopts even on contentious issues like differences on the demarcation of border or on issues like climate change. It was during the visit of Mr Wen Jiabao to India in 2005 that the two countries agreed on the guiding principles which would underlie a settlement to the border issue which had led to a brief conflict in 1962 and remains a source of tension.

The most significant aspect of the 2005 understanding was that in determining a border settlement, the two countries would “safeguard the interests of settled populations in border areas”. For India, the agreement signalled the readiness of China to discard claims to populated areas in Arunachal Pradesh and recognise the Himalayan watershed along the McMahon Line as the international border.

Mr Wen Jiabao reached out to Indian corporate leaders, mediapersons and academics, apart from a get-together with Indian school children who were thrilled to meet Grandpa Wen. His meetings were laced with quips like “India and China are friends”, “cooperation and not competition” and “there is enough space in the world for the development of both countries”. Mercifully, there were no chants of “Bhai-Bhai”.

Mr Wen Jiabao is one of the smartest figures in the politics of the Middle Kingdom. He accompanied CPC chief Zhao Ziyang during the latters fateful trip to meet the protesters in Tianamen Square in 1989. While Mr Zhao Ziyang was purged and placed under detention for “grave insubordination”, Mr Wen Jiabao survived, adeptly using his charms to rise under party leaders ranging from Mr Zhao Ziyang to Mr Hu Yaobang and Mr Jiang Zemin.

Emerging as a protégé of former Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, Mr Wen Jiabao has played the role of Grandpa Wen with the people in China during floods and the SARS epidemic. He charmed Mr George Bush in 2003 into rebuking Taiwans President Chen-Shui-bian. Barely a few years later, he drew applause from his party colleagues by warning Mr Bush on Taiwan, averring, “We dont wish foreign intervention, but are not afraid of it.”

Within a year of the 2005 agreement, China started singing an entirely new tune, laying claim to entire Arunachal Pradesh, describing it, for the first time, as “Southern Tibet”. Moreover, this period saw increasing Chinese military intrusions across the Line of Actual Control though both countries had repeatedly pledged to “maintain peace and tranquillity” along the LAC. Responding to these developments, India decided to raise two new Army divisions for deployment in Arunachal Pradesh and deployed frontline SU-30 fighter squadrons along its eastern border.

While China had traditionally avoided taking sides on India-Pakistan differences on Jammu & Kashmir, new visa procedures it adopted in 2009 were designed to show that it did not recognise Indian sovereignty over the State. Military contacts, which were being developed between the two sides, came to a grinding halt when India’s Northern Army Commander, whose area of responsibility in Jammu & Kashmir includes command of troops on its western border with China, was denied a visa to undertake a scheduled visit to Beijing.

With the US and its European partners weakened by the economic downturn, India noticed growing Chinese assertiveness in enforcing its maritime boundary claims on its Asia-Pacific neighbours, ranging from Vietnam and the Philippines to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The visiting Commander of the American Pacific Fleet was even told that his country should recognise the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean as Chinas “sphere of influence”. The Chinese vehemently opposed joint US-South Korean military exercises in the Yellow Sea after North Korea provocatively torpedoed and sank a South Korean naval vessel.

In the wake of these developments, India’s Defence Minister AK Antony visited Vietnam to boost defence cooperation and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Japan and South Korea to strengthen growing strategic ties. These visits signalled to China that India was prepared to proactively respond to its moves to strengthen Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missile capabilities and to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean.

Sensing growing unease and faced with moves by its ASEAN neighbours to recast the Asian security architecture by invitations to the US and Russia to join the East Asian Summit, China evidently realised the need to cool frayed tempers across its western border with India. Mr Wen Jiabao’s offer to visit New Delhi was welcomed as India has no desire to see tensions with China escalate.

Mr Wen Jiabao’s discussions in New Delhi appear to have been unusually candid. India had given an indication that this would happen when it brushed aside Chinese demands that it should boycott the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony honouring Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. New Delhi made its concerns clear to Mr Wen Jiabao on Chinese actions on visas for its nationals from Jammu & Kashmir, its continuing nuclear, missile and defence cooperation with Pakistan, and its growing trade surplus, which has been accentuated by denial of adequate market access to Indian corporations, in areas ranging from information technology to agro-products and pharmaceuticals.

It is also evident that suspended military-to-military ties will not be resumed till these concerns are addressed. The ritualistic reiteration of India’s One China mantra was avoided. With Chinas political leadership set to change in 2012, there are no illusions that differences on sensitive issues like the demarcation of land borders can be settled anytime soon. Nor are there expectations of any change in nuclear weapons and missile related cooperation between Beijing and Rawalpindi.

In 1991, Deng Xiaoping wisely advocated a strategy of “hide your strength, bide your time”. While Dengs advice was followed for over a decade, the People’s Liberation Army evidently concluded around 2006 that China was no longer a mere emerging power and that Dengs advice of “bide your time” was outdated. This has inevitably led to China’s neighbours getting together to respond to Chinese assertiveness.

It now appears that China’s rulers have realised the need to appear reasonable and non-aggressive. With China due for a leadership change next year, it remains to be seen if its political leadership is willing or able to rein in the hawks in the People’s Liberation Army. Moreover, can the new generation of Chinese leaders, including Vice President Xi Jinping, resist the temptation of becoming jingoistic to overcome internal contradictions? In these circumstances, there should be no slackening in steps to enhance our defence capabilities.

source; the pioneer